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HEARING ON “ENHANCED SUPERVISION: A NEW REGIME FOR  
REGULATING LARGE, COMPLEX FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS,”  
ON DECEMBER 7, 2011, BEFORE THE 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS   
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS,  
UNITED STATES SENATE 
 
WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF ARTHUR E. WILMARTH, JR. 
Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School 
Washington, D.C. 
 
 Thank you very much for inviting me to participate in this important hearing.  My 
testimony will address the following topics related to the regulation of large, complex financial 
institutions (“LCFIs”): (1) the extraordinary governmental assistance provided to “too big to fail” 
(“TBTF”) financial institutions during the financial crisis, (2) the dangerous distortions in our 
financial markets created by explicit and implicit subsidies for TBTF institutions, (3) the 
inadequacy of the regulatory regime established by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) to solve the TBTF problem, and (4) a proposed new 
set of  regulatory reforms that would require systemically important financial institutions 
(“SIFIs”) to internalize the costs of their risk-taking and prevent SIFI-owned banks from 
transferring their safety net subsidies to their nonbank affiliates.   
My proposed approach, which relies on the “narrow bank” concept, would create a true 
“market test” for SIFIs.  I believe that test would cause many SIFIs to break up voluntarily if 
they could not produce satisfactory returns to investors after losing their access to extensive 
public subsidies.  My proposed approach is similar to (a) a recent report by the U.K. Independent 
Commission on Banking (the “Vickers Report”), which advocates a “ring-fencing” concept that 
would require financial conglomerates to separate their “utility” retail banking operations from 
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their “casino” wholesale activities in the capital markets, and (b) proposed “core banking“ 
legislation introduced by Senator (then-Representative) Charles Schumer in 1991.    
1. TBTF Financial Institutions Received Extraordinary Governmental Assistance 
during the Financial Crisis 
 
The federal government provided massive amounts of financial assistance to LCFIs during 
the financial crisis.  The Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) provided $290 billion of 
capital assistance to the 19 largest U.S. banks (each with more than $100 billion of assets) and 
the largest U.S. insurance company, American International Group (“AIG”).  Federal regulators 
enabled the same 19 banks and GE Capital (a huge finance company owned General Electric) to 
issue $290 billion of FDIC-guaranteed, low-interest debt.  In contrast, smaller banks (with assets 
under $100 billion) received only $41 billion of TARP capital assistance and issued only $11 
billion of FDIC-guaranteed debt.
1
   
The Federal Reserve System (“Fed”) also provided massive amounts of credit assistance to 
financial institutions through a series of emergency lending programs. The total amount of Fed 
emergency credit reached a single-day peak of $1.2 trillion in December 2008.  The Fed 
extended the vast majority of this emergency credit to large U.S. and European banks and 
provided very little help to smaller institutions.  The highest daily amount of the Fed‟s 
                                                 
1
  Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem,” 35 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law 707, 737-38 (2010) [hereinafter Wilmarth, “Reforming Financial 
Regulation”], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1645921.  Federal regulators took an extraordinary 
step in allowing GE Capital to issue $55 billion of FDIC-guaranteed, low-interest debt securities.  GE 
Capital issued the debt securities by virtue of its ownership of two FDIC-insured depository institutions (a 
thrift and an industrial bank) located in Utah. Regulators granted GE Capital special permission to 
participate in the FDIC‟s debt guarantee program even though GE Capital was not a bank holding 
company and therefore did not meet the general terms and conditions for participation in the program.   
Indeed, GE Capital could not become a bank holding company because its parent, General Electric, is an 
industrial conglomerate that is barred by statute from owning banks.  Id. at 738 n.122, 774 n.260. 
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emergency credit to the ten largest U.S. commercial and investment banks reached $669 billion, 
representing more than half of the daily peak amount for all Fed lending programs.
2
   
The Fed and the Treasury also supported financial institutions and the financial markets by 
purchasing more than $1.5 trillion of direct obligations and mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”) 
issued by government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”).  In combination, the federal government 
provided more than $6 trillion of support to financial institutions during the financial crisis, if 
such support is measured by the peak amounts of outstanding assistance under TARP capital 
programs , Fed emergency lending programs, FDIC debt guarantees, and other asset purchase 
and guarantee programs.
3
  European nations similarly provided more than $4 trillion of financial 
support to their financial institutions by the end of 2009.
4
  
Federal regulators acted most dramatically in rescuing LCFIs that were threatened with 
failure. U.S. authorities bailed out two of the three largest U.S. banks – Bank of America 
(“BofA”) and Citigroup – as well as AIG.  In addition, federal regulators provided financial 
support for emergency acquisitions of two other major banks (Wachovia and National City), the 
two largest thrifts (Washington Mutual (“WaMu”) and Countrywide), and two of the five largest 
securities firms (Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch).  Regulators also approved emergency 
conversions of two other leading securities firms (Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley) into 
                                                 
2
  Bradley Keoun & Phil Kuntz, “Wall Street Aristocracy Got $1.2 Trillion in Secret Fed Loans,” 
Bloomberg.com, Aug. 22, 2011; Bob Ivry, Bradley Keoun & Phil Kuntz, “Secret Fed Loans Helped 
Banks Net $13 Billion,” Bloomberg.com, Nov. 27, 2011.  
3
 The “high-water mark” of the combined programs, based on the largest outstanding amount of each 
program at any one time, was $6.3 trillion.  The federal government‟s maximum potential exposure under 
those programs was $23.9 trillion.  Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (“SIGTARP”), Quarterly Report to Congress, July 21, 2010, at 116-19, 118 tbl. 3.1.  
4
 Adrian Blundell-Wignall et al., “The Elephant in the Room: The Need to Deal with What Banks Do,” 2 
Organization for Economic Co-operation & Development Journal: Financial Market Trends, Vol. 2009, 
No. 2, at 1, 4-5, 14, 15 tbl.4, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/8/44357464.pdf (stating that 
the U.S. provided $6.4 trillion of assistance to financial institutions through capital infusions, asset 
purchases, asset guarantees, and debt guarantees as of October 2009, while the United Kingdom and 
European nations provided $4.3 trillion of such assistance). 
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bank holding companies (“BHCs”), thereby placing those institutions under the FRB‟s protective 
umbrella.
5
 
The federal government further publicly guaranteed that none of the 19 largest banks 
would be allowed to fail.  When federal regulators announced their “stress tests” in early 2009, 
they declared that the Treasury Department would provide any additional capital that was needed 
to ensure the survival of all 19 banks.  Regulators also stated that they would not impose 
regulatory sanctions on the top 19 banks under the “prompt corrective action” (“PCA”) regime 
established by Congress in 1991, despite the non-discretionary nature of those sanctions.  Instead 
of issuing public enforcement orders, regulators entered into private and confidential 
“memoranda of understanding” with BofA and Citigroup despite the gravely weakened 
conditions of both banks.  Thus, federal regulators gave white-glove treatment to the 19 largest 
banks and unequivocally promised that they would survive.
6
  
In stark contrast, federal regulators imposed PCA orders and other public enforcement 
sanctions on hundreds of community banks and allowed many of those institutions to fail.
7
  
Almost 350 FDIC-insured depository institutions failed between January 1, 2008 and March 31, 
2011.
8
  Only one of those institutions – WaMu, a large thrift institution – had more than $50 
billion of assets.
9
  In view of the massive TBTF assistance that the federal government provided 
to our largest banks, it is small wonder that those banks enjoy a decisive advantage in funding 
costs over smaller banks.  As FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair pointed out in a speech on May 5, 
                                                 
5
 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-
Fail Problem,” 89 Oregon Law Review 951, 958-59, 983 (2011) [hereinafter Wilmarth, “Dodd-Frank”], 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1719126. 
6 Id. at 958-59, 983; Wilmarth, “Reforming Financial Regulation,” supra note 1, at 712-13, 743-44. 
7
  Wilmarth, “Reforming Financial Regulation,” supra note 1, at 744, 744 n.145.  
8
  5 FDIC Quarterly No. 2 (2011), at 16 (Table II-B). 
9
  2 FDIC Quarterly No. 4 (2008), at 14 (referring to the failure of Washington Mutual Bank, with $307 
billion of assets, on Sept. 25, 2008). 
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2011, “In the fourth quarter of [2010], the average interest cost of funding earning assets for 
banks with more than $100 billion in assets was about half the average for community banks 
with less than $1 billion in assets.”10 
When the federal government finally promised to help community banks, it failed to 
deliver.  On February 2, 2010, President Obama announced a new program that would use $30 
billion of TARP funds to assist community banks in making small business loans.
11
  However, in 
September 2011, the Treasury Department shut down the Small Business Lending Fund after 
providing only $4.2 billion – just 14% of the promised amount – to community banks.  Members 
of Congress strongly criticized the Treasury Department for long delays in approving 
applications by community banks and for imposing onerous conditions on applicants.
12
 
2. TBTF Subsidies Distort Our Financial Markets and Create Perverse Incentives for 
Excessive Risk-Taking and Unhealthy Consolidation  
 
At the height of the financial crisis in March 2009, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke admitted 
that “the too-big-to-fail issue has emerged as an enormous problem” because “it reduces market 
discipline and encourages excessive risk-taking” by TBTF firms.13 Several months later, 
Governor Mervyn King of the Bank of England condemned the perverse incentives created by 
TBTF subsidies in even stronger terms. Governor King maintained that “[t]he massive support 
extended to the banking sector around the world, while necessary to avert economic disaster, has 
                                                 
10
  Sheila C. Bair, “We Must Resolve to End Too Big to Fail,” 5 FDIC Quarterly No. 2 (2011), at 25, 26 
(reprinting speech delivered on May 5, 2011). 
11
  Cheryl Bolen, “Troubled Asset Relief Program: White House Explains $30 Billion Plan To Expand 
Bank Loans to Small Businesses,” 94 BNA’s Banking Report 262 (Feb. 9, 2010). 
12
 Kevin Wack, “Lending Fund Puts Geithner on the Defensive,” American Banker, Oct. 19, 2011. 
13
 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Financial Reform to Address 
Systemic Risk, Speech at the Council on Foreign Relations (Mar. 10, 2009), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090310a.htm. 
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created possibly the biggest moral hazard in history.”14 He further argued that TBTF subsidies 
provided a likely explanation for decisions by LCFIs to engage in high-risk strategies during the 
credit boom: 
Why were banks willing to take risks that proved so damaging to themselves and 
the rest of the economy? One of the key reasons – mentioned by market 
participants in conversations before the crisis hit – is that incentives to manage 
risk and to increase leverage were distorted by the implicit support or guarantee 
provided by government to creditors of banks that were seen as „too important to 
fail.‟ . . . Banks and their creditors knew that if they were sufficiently important to 
the economy or the rest of the financial system, and things went wrong, the 
government would always stand behind them. And they were right.
15
  
 
 Industry studies and anecdotal evidence confirm that TBTF subsidies create significant 
economic distortions and promote moral hazard.  In recent years, and particularly during the 
present crisis, LCFIs have operated with much lower capital ratios and have benefited from a 
much lower cost of funds, compared with smaller banks.  In addition, credit ratings agencies and 
bond market investors have given preferential treatment to TBTF institutions because of the 
explicit and implicit government backing they receive.
16
 
 A recent study shows that large banks have received huge benefits from the implicit 
TBTF subsidy over the past two decades.
17
  This study, which analyzed publicly-traded bonds 
issued by U.S. banks between 1990 and 2010, concluded that bond investors expected the federal 
government to support the largest banks throughout that period.  Although the largest banks 
                                                 
14 Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, Speech to Scottish Business Organizations in 
Edinburgh 4 (Oct. 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech406.pdf [hereinafter King 2009 
Speech].  See also Richard S. Carnell, Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Law of Banking and 
Financial Institutions 326 (4th
 ed. 2009) (explaining that “moral hazard” results from the fact that 
“[i]nsurance changes the incentives of the person insured . . . . [I]f you no longer fear a harm [due to 
insurance], you no longer have an incentive to take precautions against it”). 
15
 King 2009 Speech, supra note 144, at 3. 
16
 Wilmarth, “Dodd-Frank,” supra note 5, at 981-84 (citing studies and other evidence).  
17
 A. Joseph Warburton & Daniz Anginer, “The End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of 
Implicit State Guarantees” (Nov. 18, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1961656. 
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pursued riskier strategies, they issued bonds with significantly lower yield spreads over Treasury 
bonds, compared to bonds issued by smaller banks.
18
  Additionally, the authors found that bond 
investors responded significantly to Fitch‟s “issuer” ratings that included the expectation of 
governmental support for the biggest banks, but bond investors did not respond significantly to 
Fitch‟s “individual” ratings based on the standalone strength of the same banks.  In other words, 
“investors do not price the true, intrinsic ability of a [big] bank to repay its debts, but instead 
price implicit government support for the bank.”19  
The authors determined that the implicit TBTF subsidy gave the largest banks 
an annual [average] funding cost advantage of approximately 16 basis points before 
the financial crisis, increasing to 88 basis points during the crisis, peaking at more 
than 100 basis points in 2008.  The total value of the subsidy amounted to about $4 
billion per year before the crisis, increasing to $60 billion [annually] during the 
crisis, topping $84 billion in 2008.
20
   
 
Moreover, the authors found that “[t]he passage of Dodd-Frank in July of 2010 did not eliminate 
investors‟ expectations of government support.  In fact, expectations of government support rose 
in 2010 [compared to 2009].”21 The authors concluded that the value of the implicit TBTF 
subsidy to large banks was highest during times of financial crisis (i.e., the 1980s, 1997-98, 
2000-02, and 2007-10).  However, the subsidy “persists even during times of relative tranquility” 
and therefore represents “an ongoing wealth transfer” from taxpayers to large banks.22   
The financial crisis has vividly illustrated the tendency of LCFIs to exploit their explicit 
safety net subsidies (i.e., federal deposit insurance and access to the Fed‟s discount window) and 
their implicit TBTF subsidy by using their access to low-cost funds to finance high-risk 
                                                 
18
 Id. at 3, 10-11, 14-15. 
19
 Id. at 3, 15-17. 
20
 Id. at 4, 12. 
21
 Id. at 19, 33 (Figure 4). 
22
 Id. at 18-20, 33 (Figure 4). 
 8 
activities.
23
  As I have explained in previous articles, LCFIs were “the primary private-sector 
catalysts for the destructive credit boom that led to the subprime financial crisis, and they 
[became] the epicenter of the current global financial mess.”24  Eighteen major LCFIs – 
including ten leading U.S. financial institutions and eight giant foreign banks – were the 
dominant players in global securities and derivatives markets during the credit boom.
25
  Those 18 
LCFIs included most of the top underwriters for nonprime MBS, other types of asset-backed 
securities (“ABS”) and leveraged buyout (“LBO”) loans, as well as related collateralized debt 
obligations (“CDOs”) and credit default swaps (“CDS”).  Although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
funded about a fifth of the nonprime mortgage market between 2003 and 2007, they did so 
primarily by purchasing nonprime mortgages and private-label MBS that were originated or 
underwritten by LCFIs.  LCFIs provided most of the rest of the funding for nonprime home 
                                                 
23
 A recent study explains that “[a] nation‟s financial safety net consists of whatever array of programs it 
uses to protect bank depositors and to keep systemically important markets and institutions from breaking 
down in difficult circumstances.”  The study further points out that, during the current financial crisis, 
government agencies in the U.S. and the European Union “exercised a loss-shifting „taxpayer put‟ that 
converted most of the losses incurred by insolvent [TBTF] firms into government debt.”  Edward J. Kane 
et al., Safety-Net Benefits Conferred on Difficult-to-Fail-and-Unwind Banks in the U.S. and EU Before 
and During the Great Recession at 2, 4 (July 1, 2011), Paolo Baffi Center Research Paper No. 2011-95, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1884131.  
24
 Wilmarth, “Dodd-Frank,” supra note 5, at 977 (quoting Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “The Dark Side of 
Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis,” 41 
Connecticut Law Review 963, 1046 (2009) [hereinafter Wilmarth, “Financial Conglomerates”], available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1403973). 
25 During the credit boom that led to the financial crisis, the 18 leading LCFIs in global and U.S. markets 
for securities underwriting, securitizations, structured-finance products and over-the-counter derivatives 
(the “big eighteen”) included the four largest U.S. banks (BofA, JP Morgan Chase (“Chase”), Citigroup 
and Wachovia), the five largest U.S. securities firms (Bear Stearns (“Bear”), Goldman Sachs 
(“Goldman”), Lehman Brothers (“Lehman”), Merrill Lynch (“Merrill”) and Morgan Stanley), the largest 
U.S. insurance company (AIG), and eight foreign universal banks (Barclays, BNP Paribas, Credit Suisse, 
Deutsche, HSBC, Royal Bank of Scotland (“RBS”), Société Générale and UBS).  See Wilmarth, “Dodd-
Frank,” supra note 5, at 966 n.45.  
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mortgages, as well as much of the financing for risky credit card loans, commercial real estate 
(“CRE”) loans and LBO loans.26   
I have estimated that LCFIs were responsible for financing about $9 trillion of risky 
private-sector debt that was outstanding in U.S. financial markets in 2007 in the form of 
nonprime home mortgages, credit card loans, CRE loans, LBO loans and junk bonds.  Even 
worse, LCFIs underwrote some $25 trillion of structured-finance securities and derivatives 
whose value depended on the performance of that risky debt, including MBS, ABS, cash flow 
CDOs, synthetic CDOs and CDS.  Thus, LCFIs created “an invested pyramid of risk,” which 
allowed investors to place “multiple layers of financial bets” on the performance of high-risk 
loans in securitized pools.  Consequently, when the underlying loans began to default, the 
leverage inherent in this “pyramid of risk” produced losses that were much larger than the face 
amounts of the defaulted loans.
27
     
The central role of LCFIs in the financial crisis is confirmed by the enormous losses they 
suffered and the huge bailouts they received.  The “big eighteen” LCFIs accounted for three-
fifths of the $1.5 trillion of total worldwide losses recorded by banks, securities firms and 
insurers between the outbreak of the financial crisis in mid-2007 and the spring of 2010.
28
  The 
list of leading LCFIs is “a who‟s who of the current financial crisis” that includes “[m]any of the 
                                                 
26
 Id. at 977-78; see also Phil Angelides, “Fannie, Freddie and the Financial Crisis,” Bloomberg.com, 
Aug. 3, 2011 (summarizing report prepared by the staff of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
(“FCIC”), and stating that Fannie and Freddie were “disasters” but not the “primary cause of the crisis” 
because (i) the GSEs “purchased the highest-rated portions of „private label‟ mortgage securities 
produced by Wall Street,” (ii) “[w]hile such purchases added helium to the housing balloon, they 
represented just 10.5 percent of „private-label‟ subprime-mortgage-backed securities in 2001, then rose to 
40 percent in 2004, and fell back to 28 percent in 2008,” (iii) “[p]rivate investors gobbled up the lion‟s 
share of those securities, including the riskier portions,” and (iv) “data compiled by the FCIC for a subset 
of borrowers with [credit] scores below 660 shows that by the end of 2008, far fewer GSE mortgages 
were seriously delinquent than non-GSE securitized mortgages: 6.2 percent versus 28.3 percent”). 
27
 Wilmarth, “Dodd-Frank,” supra note 5, at 966-67; Wilmarth, “Financial Conglomerates,” supra note 
24, at 988-96, 1024-41. 
28 Wilmarth, “Dodd-Frank,” supra note 5, at 978.  
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firms that either went bust . . . or suffered huge write-downs that led to significant government 
intervention.”29  Lehman failed, while two other members of the “big eighteen” LCFIs (AIG and 
RBS) were nationalized and three others (Bear, Merrill, and Wachovia) were acquired by other 
LCFIs with substantial governmental assistance. Three additional members of the group 
(Citigroup, BofA, and UBS) survived only because they received costly government bailouts.
30
 
Chase, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley received substantial infusions of TARP capital, and 
Goldman and Morgan Stanley quickly converted to BHCs to secure permanent access to the 
FRB‟s discount window as well as “the Fed‟s public promise of protection.”31   
Thus, only Lehman failed of the “big eighteen” LCFIs, but the U.S., the U.K. and 
European nations provided massive financial assistance to ensure the survival of at least twelve 
other members of the group.
32
 Studies have shown that the TARP capital infusions and FDIC 
debt guarantees announced in October 2008 represented very large transfers of wealth from 
taxpayers to the shareholders and creditors of the largest U.S. LCFIs.
33
  In addition, a recent 
                                                 
29 Id. (quoting study by Dwight Jaffee). 
30
 Id.; Wilmarth, “Financial Conglomerates,” supra note 24, at 1044-45 (explaining that Citigroup and 
BofA “received huge bailout packages from the U.S. government that included $90 billion of capital 
infusions and more than $400 billion of asset price guarantees,” while UBS “received a $60 billion 
bailout package from the Swiss government”). 
31
 David Wessel, In Fed We Trust: Ben Bernanke’s War on the Great Panic 217–18, 227, 236–40  (2009) 
(noting that Chase received $25 billion of TARP capital while Goldman and Morgan Stanley each 
received $10 billion); see also Ivry, Keoun & Kuntz, supra  note 2 (stating that BofA‟s acquisition of 
Merrill Lynch was supported by more than $60 billion of Fed emergency credit, while Wells Fargo‟s 
takeover of Wachovia was helped by $50 billion of Fed emergency credit and Chase‟s acquisition of Bear 
was assisted by $30 billion of Fed emergency credit). 
32
 Wilmarth, “Dodd-Frank,” supra note 5, at 978-79. 
33
 Elijah Brewer III & Anne Marie Klingenhagen, “Be Careful What You Wish for: The Stock Market 
Reactions to Bailing Out Large Financial Institutions,” 18 Journal of Financial Regulation and 
Compliance 56, 57–59, 64–66 (2010) (finding significant increases in stock market valuations for the 25 
largest U.S. banks as a result of Treasury Secretary Paulson‟s announcement, on Oct. 14, 2008, of $250 
billion of TARP capital infusions into the banking system, including $125 billion for the nine largest 
banks); Pietro Veronesi & Luigi Zingales, “Paulson‟s Gift,” 97 Journal of Financial Economics 339, 340-
41, 364 (2010) (concluding that the TARP capital infusions and FDIC debt guarantees announced in 
October 2008 produced $130 billion of gains for holders of equity and debt securities of the nine largest 
U.S. banks, at an estimated cost to taxpayers of $21 to $44 billion); Eric de Bodt et al., The Paulson 
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study concluded that the “below-market rates” charged by the Fed on its emergency credit 
programs produced $13 billion of profits for the banks that participated in those programs, 
including $4.8 billion of earnings for the six largest U.S. banks.
34
 
Given the major advantages conferred by TBTF status, it is not surprising that LCFIs 
have pursued aggressive growth strategies during the past two decades to reach a size at which 
they would be considered TBTF. All of today‟s four largest U.S. banks (Chase, BofA, Citigroup 
and Wells Fargo) are the products of serial acquisitions and explosive growth since 1990.  
BofA‟s and Citigroup‟s rapid expansions led them to brink of failure, from which they were 
saved by huge federal bailouts.  Wachovia (the fourth-largest U.S. bank at the beginning of the 
financial crisis) pursued a similar path of frenetic growth until it collapsed in 2008 and was 
rescued by Wells Fargo in a federally-assisted merger.  A comparable pattern of rapid expansion, 
collapse and bailout occurred among RBS, UBS and other European LCFIs.
35
  
By helping major banks to acquire troubled LCFIs, U.S. regulators have produced 
domestic financial markets in which the largest banks enjoy an unhealthy dominance.  In 2009, 
the four largest U.S. banks (BofA, Chase, Citigroup and Wells Fargo) controlled 56% of 
domestic banking assets, up from 35% in 2000, while the top ten U.S. banks controlled 75% of 
domestic banking assets, up from 54% in 2000. The four largest banks also controlled a majority 
                                                                                                                                                             
Plan‟s Competitive Effects (May 2011), at 2-4, 15-21 (finding that TARP capital infusions between 
October 2008 and December 2009 produced significant gains for shareholders of the largest banks but 
imposed losses on shareholders of smaller banks by injuring the competitiveness of those banks); 
Congressional Oversight Panel, February Oversight Report: Valuing Treasury’s Acquisitions (Feb. 6, 
2009), at 4-8, 26-29, 36-38 (presenting a valuation study concluding that (i) TARP capital infusions into 
eight major banks (BofA, Citigroup, Chase, Goldman, Morgan Stanley, US Bancorp and Wells Fargo) 
provided an average subsidy to those banks equal to 22% of the Treasury‟s investment, and (ii) additional 
capital infusions into AIG and Citigroup under TARP provided an average subsidy to those institutions 
equal to 59% of the Treasury‟s investment), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-020609-
report.pdf.  
34
 Ivry, Keoun & Kuntz, supra note 2 (reporting that “[d]uring the crisis, Fed loans were among the 
cheapest around, with funding available for as low as 0.01 percent in December 2008”). 
35
 Wilmarth, “Dodd-Frank,” supra note 5, at 984-85; Wilmarth, “Reforming Financial Regulation,” supra 
note 1, at 746 n.153.  
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of the product markets for home mortgages, home equity loans, and credit card loans. The same 
four banks and Goldman accounted for 97% of the aggregate notional values of OTC derivatives 
contracts written by U.S. banks.
36
  
The combined assets of the six largest banks – the foregoing five institutions plus Morgan 
Stanley – were equal to 63% of U.S. GDP in 2009, compared with only 17% of GDP in 1995.37  
Nomi Prins has observed that, as a result of the financial crisis, “we have larger players who are 
more powerful, who are more dependent on government capital and who are harder to regulate 
than they were to begin with.”38  Similarly, Simon Johnson and James Kwak maintain that “the 
problem at the heart of the financial system [is] the enormous growth of top-tier financial 
institutions and the corresponding increase in their economic and political power.”39 
3. The Dodd-Frank Act Does Not Solve the TBTF Problem 
In two articles written in 2002 and 2009, I warned that “the TBTF policy is the great 
unresolved problem of bank supervision” because it “undermines the effectiveness of both 
supervisory and market discipline.”40 As I pointed out in both articles, Congress‟ decision to 
enact the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) and repeal the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 
authorized the creation of large financial conglomerates that spanned the entire range of our 
                                                 
36 Wilmarth, “Dodd-Frank,” supra note 5, at 985. 
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 Simon Johnson & James Kwak, 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial 
Meltdown 202-03, 217 (2010); Peter Boone & Simon Johnson, “Shooting Banks,” New Republic, Mar. 
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Kuntz, supra note 2 (reporting that “[t]otal assets held by the six biggest U.S. banks increased 39 percent 
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financial markets. I warned that the emergence of these new financial giants would bring “major 
segments of the securities and life insurance industries . . . within the scope of the TBTF 
doctrine, thereby expanding the scope and cost of federal „safety net‟ subsidies.”  I also warned 
that big financial conglomerates would take advantage of their new powers under GLBA and 
their presumed TBTF status by pursuing risky activities involving complex securities and 
derivatives, and by increasing their leverage through “capital arbitrage.”41  As I pointed out in 
2009: 
Unfortunately, the [current] financial crisis has confirmed all of the 
foregoing predictions.  Over the past decade, regulators in developed nations 
encouraged the expansion of large financial conglomerates and failed to restrain 
their pursuit of short-term profits through increased leverage and high-risk 
activities.  As a result, LCFIs were allowed to promote an enormous credit boom, 
and that boom precipitated a worldwide financial crisis.  In order to avoid a 
complete collapse of global financial markets, central banks and governments 
have already provided almost $9 trillion of support . . .  for major banks, securities 
firms and insurance companies.  Those support measures – which are far from 
over – establish beyond any doubt that the TBTF policy now embraces the entire 
financial services industry.
42
  
 
The financial crisis has demonstrated that TBTF subsidies create dangerous distortions in 
our financial markets and our general economy, and those subsidies must be eliminated (or at 
least significantly reduced) in order to restore a more level playing field for smaller financial 
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institutions and to encourage the voluntary breakup of inefficient and risky financial 
conglomerates.
43
  The financial crisis has also proven, beyond any reasonable doubt, that large 
financial conglomerates operate based on a hazardous business model that is riddled with 
conflicts of interest and prone to speculative risk-taking.
44
  Accordingly, U.S. and European 
governments must adopt reforms to ensure that effective supervisory and market discipline is 
applied against LCFIs, 
A few months before Dodd-Frank was enacted, I wrote an article proposing five key 
reforms to accomplish these objectives.  My proposed reforms would have (1) strengthened 
existing statutory restrictions on the growth of LCFIs, (2) created a special resolution process to 
manage the orderly liquidation or restructuring of systemically important financial institutions 
(“SIFIs”), (3) established a consolidated supervisory regime and enhanced capital requirements 
for SIFIs, (4) created a special insurance fund to cover the costs of resolving failed SIFIs, and (5) 
rigorously insulated FDIC-insured banks that are owned by LCFIs from the activities and risks of 
their nonbank affiliates.
45
  
The following sections of my testimony discuss my proposed reforms and compare those 
proposals to relevant provisions of Dodd-Frank. As shown below, Dodd-Frank includes a portion 
of my first proposal as well as the major components of my second and third proposals.  
However, Dodd-Frank omits most of my last two proposals.  In my opinion, Dodd-Frank‟s 
omissions are highly significant and raise serious doubts about the statute‟s ability to prevent 
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TBTF bailouts in the future.  As explained below, a careful reading of Dodd-Frank indicates that 
Congress has left the door open for taxpayer-funded protection of creditors of SIFIs during future 
financial crises. 
a. Dodd-Frank Modestly Strengthened Existing Statutory Limits on the Growth of 
LCFIs But Did Not Close Significant Loopholes     
 
Congress authorized nationwide banking – via interstate branching and interstate 
acquisitions of banks by BHCs – when it passed the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Act of 1994 (“Riegle-Neal Act”).46  To prevent the emergence of dominant 
megabanks, the Riegle-Neal Act imposed nationwide and statewide deposit concentration limits 
(“deposit caps”) on interstate expansion by large banking organizations.47  Under the Riegle-
Neal Act, a BHC may not acquire a bank in another state, and a bank may not merge with 
another bank across state lines, if the resulting banking organization (together with all affiliated 
FDIC-insured depository institutions) would hold (i) 10% or more of the total deposits of all 
depository institutions in the U.S., or (ii) 30% or more of the total deposits of all depository 
institutions in a single state.
48
  
Unfortunately, Riegle-Neal‟s nationwide and statewide deposit caps contained three 
major loopholes.  First, the deposit caps applied only to interstate bank acquisitions and interstate 
bank mergers, and the deposit caps therefore did not restrict combinations between banking 
organizations headquartered in the same state.  Second, the deposit caps did not apply to 
acquisitions of, or mergers with, thrift institutions and industrial banks, because those institutions 
were not treated as “banks” under the Riegle-Neal Act.  Third, the deposit caps did not apply to 
                                                 
46
 Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338, Sept. 29, 1994. 
47
 See House Report No. 103-448, at 65–66 (1994) (additional views of Rep. Neal and Rep. McCollum) 
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acquisitions of, or mergers with, banks that are “in default or in danger of default” (the “failing 
bank” exception).49 
The emergency acquisitions of Countrywide, Merrill, WaMu and Wachovia in 2008 
demonstrated the significance of Riegle-Neal‟s loopholes and the necessity of closing them. In 
reliance on the “non-bank” loophole, the FRB allowed BofA to acquire Countrywide and Merrill 
even though (i) both firms controlled FDIC-insured depository institutions (a thrift, in the case of 
Countrywide, and a thrift and industrial bank, in the case of Merrill), and (ii) both transactions 
allowed BofA to exceed the 10% nationwide deposit cap. Similarly, after the FDIC seized 
control of WaMu as a failed depository institution, the FDIC sold the giant thrift to Chase even 
though the transaction enabled Chase to exceed the 10% nationwide deposit cap. Finally, 
although the FRB determined that Wells Fargo‟s acquisition of Wachovia gave Wells Fargo 
control of just under 10% of nationwide deposits, the FRB probably could have approved the 
acquisition in any case by designating Wachovia as a bank “in danger of default.”50 
As a result of the foregoing acquisitions, BofA, Chase and Wells Fargo each surpassed 
the 10% nationwide deposit cap by October 2008. To prevent further breaches of the Riegle-Neal 
concentration limits, I proposed that Congress should extend the nationwide and statewide 
deposit caps to cover all intrastate and interstate transactions involving any type of FDIC-insured 
depository institution, including thrifts and industrial banks.  In addition, I proposed that 
Congress should significantly narrow the failing bank exception by requiring federal regulators 
to make a “systemic risk determination” (“SRD”) in order to approve any acquisition involving a 
failing depository institution that would exceed either the nationwide or statewide deposit caps.
51
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Under my proposed standard for an SRD, the FRB and the FDIC could not invoke the 
failing bank exception unless they determined jointly, with the concurrence of the Treasury 
Secretary, that the proposed acquisition was necessary to avoid a substantial threat of severe 
systemic injury to the banking system, the financial markets or the national economy. In 
addition, each SRD would be audited by the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) to 
determine whether regulators satisfied the criteria for an SRD, and would also be reviewed in a 
joint hearing held by the House and Senate committees with oversight of the financial markets 
(the “SRD Review Procedure”). My proposed SRD requirements would ensure much greater 
public transparency of, and scrutiny for, any federal agency order that invokes the failing bank 
exception to the Riegle-Neal deposit caps.
52
  
Section 623 of Dodd-Frank does extend Riegle-Neal‟s 10% nationwide deposit cap to 
reach all interstate acquisitions and mergers involving any type of FDIC-insured depository 
institution. Thus, interstate acquisitions and mergers involving thrift institutions and industrial 
banks are now subject to the nationwide deposit cap to the same extent as interstate acquisitions 
and mergers involving commercial banks. However, § 623 leaves open the other Riegle-Neal 
loopholes because (1) it does not apply the nationwide deposit cap to intrastate acquisitions or 
mergers, (2) it does not apply the statewide deposit cap to interstate transactions involving thrifts 
or industrial banks or to any type of intrastate transaction, and (3) it does not impose any 
enhanced substantive or procedural requirements for invoking the failing bank exception.  
Hence, § 623 of Dodd-Frank closes one important loophole but fails to close other significant 
exemptions that continue to undermine the effectiveness of Riegle-Neal‟s deposit caps.53   
                                                 
52
 Id. at 990.  As discussed below, § 203 of Dodd-Frank establishes a similar “Systemic Risk 
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Section 622 of Dodd-Frank authorizes federal regulators to impose a separate 
concentration limit on mergers and acquisitions involving “financial companies.”  As defined in 
§ 622, the term “financial companies” includes insured depository institutions and their holding 
companies, nonbank SIFIs and foreign banks operating in the U.S.  Subject to two significant 
exceptions described below, § 622 potentially bars any acquisition or merger that would give a 
“financial company” control of more than 10% of the total “liabilities” of all financial 
companies.  This limitation on control of nationwide liabilities (“liabilities cap”) was originally 
proposed by former FRB Chairman Paul Volcker.
54
   
The liabilities cap in § 622 provides an additional method for restricting the growth of 
very large financial companies (e.g., Citigroup, Goldman, and Morgan Stanley) that rely mainly 
on funding from the capital markets instead of deposits.
55
 However, the liabilities cap has two 
significant exceptions.  First, it is subject to a “failing bank” exception (similar to the “failing 
bank” loophole in Riegle-Neal), which regulators can invoke without making any SRD.  Second, 
and more importantly, the liabilities cap is not self-executing.  Section 622 requires the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) to consider (based on a cost-benefit analysis) whether the 
statutory liabilities cap should be modified.  Section 622 also requires the FRB to implement the 
liabilities cap in accordance with any modifications recommended by FSOC.
56
   
Thus, § 622 allows the FSOC and FRB to weaken (and perhaps even eliminate) the 
liabilities cap if they determine that the cap would have adverse effects that outweigh its 
potential benefits.  Consequently, it is doubtful whether Dodd-Frank will impose any meaningful 
new limit on the growth of LCFIs beyond the statute‟s beneficial extension of the nationwide 
deposit cap to reach all interstate acquisitions and mergers involving FDIC-insured institutions. 
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b. Dodd-Frank Establishes a Special Resolution Regime for Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions But Allows the FDIC to Provide Full Protection for Favored 
Creditors of Those Institutions 
 
i. Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority Does Not Preclude Full 
Protection of Favored Creditors of SIFIs 
 
Dodd-Frank establishes an Orderly Liquidation Authority (“OLA”), which seeks to 
provide a “viable alternative to the undesirable choice . . . between bankruptcy of a large, 
complex financial company that would disrupt markets and damage the economy, and bailout of 
such financial company that would expose taxpayers to losses and undermine market 
discipline.”57 In some respects, the OLA for SIFIs – which is similar to the FDIC‟s existing 
resolution regime for failed depository institutions
58
 – resembles my earlier proposal for a special 
resolution regime for SIFIs.
59
  However, contrary to the statute‟s stated purpose,60 Dodd-Frank‟s 
OLA does not preclude future bailouts for favored creditors of TBTF institutions. 
 Dodd-Frank establishes FSOC as an umbrella organization with systemic risk oversight 
authority. FSOC‟s voting members include the leaders of nine federal financial regulatory 
agencies and an independent member having insurance experience.  By a two-thirds vote, FSOC 
may determine that a domestic or foreign nonbank financial company should be subject to Dodd-
Frank‟s systemic risk regime, which includes prudential supervision by the FRB and potential 
liquidation by the FDIC under the OLA.  In deciding whether to impose Dodd-Frank‟s systemic 
risk regime on a nonbank financial company, the crucial question to be decided by FSOC is 
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whether “material financial distress at the . . . nonbank financial company, or the nature, scope, 
size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the . . . nonbank 
financial company, could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States.”61    
Dodd-Frank does not use the term “systemically important financial institution” to 
describe a nonbank financial company that is subject to the statute‟s systemic risk regime, but I 
will generally refer to such companies as SIFIs.  Dodd-Frank treats BHCs with assets of more 
than $50 billion as SIFIs, and those BHCs are also subject to enhanced supervision by the FRB 
and potential liquidation by the FDIC under the OLA.
62
 Dodd-Frank properly recognizes that – 
absent mandatory breakups of LCFIs – the best way to impose effective discipline on SIFIs, and 
to reduce the federal subsidies they receive, is to designate them publicly as SIFIs and to impose 
stringent regulatory requirements that force them to internalize the potential costs of their TBTF 
status.
63
  However, it is noteworthy – and disturbing – that FSOC has not yet publicly designated 
any large nonbank financial firm as a SIFI, even though almost 18 months have gone by since 
Dodd-Frank‟s enactment. 
 As I and many others have proposed, Article II of Dodd-Frank establishes a systemic 
resolution process – the OLA – to handle the failures of SIFIs.64  In order to invoke the OLA for 
a “covered financial company,” the Treasury Secretary must issue an SRD, based on the 
recommendation of the FRB together with either the FDIC or the SEC (if the failing company‟s 
largest subsidiary is a securities broker or dealer) or the Federal Insurance Office (if the failing 
company‟s largest subsidiary is an insurance company). The Treasury Secretary‟s SRD must find 
that (i) the covered financial company‟s failure and resolution under otherwise applicable 
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insolvency rules (e.g, the federal bankruptcy laws) would have “serious adverse effects on 
financial stability,” (ii) application of the OLA would “avoid or mitigate such adverse effects,” 
and (iii) “no viable private sector alternative is available to prevent” the company‟s failure.65   
I have argued that the systemic resolution process for SIFIs should embody three core 
principles in order to create a close similarity between that process and Chapter 11 of the federal 
Bankruptcy Code.  Those core principles are: (A) requiring equity owners in a failed SIFI to lose 
their entire investment if the SIFI‟s assets are insufficient to pay all valid creditor claims, (B) 
removing senior managers and other employees who were responsible for the SIFI‟s failure, and 
(C) requiring unsecured creditors to accept meaningful “haircuts” in the form of significant 
reductions of their debt claims or an exchange of substantial portions of their debt claims for 
equity in a successor institution.
66
   
Dodd-Frank incorporates the first two of my core principles.  It requires the FDIC to 
ensure that equity owners of a failed SIFI do not receive any payment until all creditor claims are 
paid, and that managers responsible for the failure are removed.  At first sight, Dodd-Frank also 
seems to embody the third principle by directing the FDIC to impose losses on unsecured 
creditors if a failed SIFI‟s assets are insufficient to pay all secured and unsecured debts. 
However, a careful reading of the statute reveals that Dodd-Frank allows the FDIC to provide 
full protection to favored classes of unsecured creditors of failed SIFIs.
67
  
In its capacity as receiver for a failed SIFI, the FDIC may provide funds for the payment 
or transfer of creditors‟ claims in at least two ways. First, the FDIC may provide funding directly 
to the SIFI‟s receivership estate by making loans, purchasing or guaranteeing assets, or assuming 
or guaranteeing liabilities. Second, the FDIC may provide funding to establish a “bridge 
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financial company” (“BFC”), and the FDIC may then approve a transfer of designated assets and 
liabilities from the failed SIFI to the BFC. In either case, the FDIC may (i) take steps to 
“mitigate[] the potential for serious adverse effects to the financial system,” and (ii) provide 
preferential treatment to certain creditors if the FDIC determines that such treatment is necessary 
to “maximize” the value of a failed SIFI‟s assets or to preserve “essential” operations of the SIFI 
or a successor BFC.  Subject to the foregoing conditions, the FDIC may give preferential 
treatment to certain creditors as long as every creditor receives at least the amount she would 
have recovered in a liquidation proceeding under Chapter 7 of the federal Bankruptcy Code.
68
 
In October 2010, the FDIC issued a proposed rule to implement its authority under the 
OLA. In January 2011, the FDIC approved the proposed OLA rule as an interim final rule.
69
 
Under the OLA rule, the FDIC may provide preferential treatment to certain creditors in order 
“to continue key operations, services, and transactions that will maximize the value of the [failed 
SIFI‟s] assets and avoid a disorderly collapse in the marketplace.”70  The OLA rule excludes the 
following classes of creditors from any possibility of preferential treatment: (i) holders of 
unsecured senior debt with a term of more than 360 days, and (ii) holders of subordinated debt.  
Accordingly, the OLA rule would allow the FDIC to provide full protection to short-term, 
unsecured creditors of a failed SIFI whenever the FDIC determines that such protection is 
“essential for [the SIFI‟s] continued operation and orderly liquidation.”71  
The OLA rule would allow the FDIC to give full protection to short-term liabilities of 
SIFIs, including commercial paper and securities repurchase agreements.  Those types of 
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wholesale liabilities proved to be highly volatile and prone to creditor “runs” during the financial 
crisis.
72
 Unfortunately, by stating that the FDIC reserves the right to provide preferential 
treatment  to short-term creditors of failed SIFIs, but will never provide such treatment to holders 
of long-term debt or subordinated debt, the OLA rule is likely have at least two perverse results.  
The OLA rule (i) creates the appearance of an implicit subsidy to short-term creditors of SIFIs, 
and (ii) encourages SIFIs to rely even more heavily on vulnerable, short-term funding strategies 
that led to repeated disasters during the financial crisis.
73
   
As indicated by the OLA rule, Dodd-Frank gives the FDIC considerable leeway to 
provide de facto bailouts for favored creditors of failed SIFIs. Dodd-Frank also provides a 
funding source for such bailouts. Section 201(n) of Dodd-Frank establishes an Orderly 
Liquidation Fund (“OLF”) to finance liquidations of SIFIs.  As discussed below, Dodd-Frank 
does not establish a pre-funding mechanism for the OLF.  However, the FDIC may obtain funds 
for the OLF by borrowing from the Treasury in amounts up to (i) 10% of a failed SIFI‟s assets 
within thirty days after the FDIC‟s appointment as receiver, plus (ii) 90% of the “fair value” of 
the SIFI‟s assets that are “available for repayment” thereafter.”74  The FDIC‟s authority to 
borrow from the Treasury provides an immediate source of funding to protect unsecured 
creditors that are deemed to have systemic significance.  In addition, the “fair value” standard 
potentially gives the FDIC considerable discretion in appraising the assets of a failed SIFI, since 
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the standard does not require the FDIC to rely on current market values in measuring the value of 
a failed SIFI‟s assets.75     
Dodd-Frank generally requires the FDIC to impose a “claw-back” on creditors who 
receive preferential treatment if the proceeds of liquidating a failed SIFI are insufficient to repay 
the full amount that the FDIC borrows from the Treasury to conduct the liquidation.  However, 
Dodd-Frank authorizes the FDIC to exercise its powers under the OLA (including its authority to 
provide preferential treatment to favored creditors of a failed SIFI) for the purpose of preserving 
“the financial stability of the United States” and preventing “serious adverse effects to the 
financial system.”76  Therefore, the FDIC could conceivably assert the power to waive its right of 
“claw-back” against a failed SIFI‟s creditors who received preferential treatment if the FDIC 
determines that such a waiver is necessary to maintain the stability of the financial markets.
77
 
ii.    Dodd-Frank Does Not Prevent Federal Regulators from Using Other Sources 
of Funding to Protect Creditors of SIFIs 
 
Dodd-Frank could potentially be interpreted as allowing the FDIC to borrow an 
additional $100 billion from the Treasury for use in accomplishing the orderly liquidation of a 
failed SIFI.  Dodd-Frank states that the FDIC‟s borrowing authority for the OLF does not 
“affect” the FDIC‟s authority to borrow from the Treasury Department under 12 U.S.C. § 
1824(a).
78
  Under §1824(a), the FDIC may exercise its “judgment” to borrow up to $100 billion 
from the Treasury “for insurance purposes,” and the term “insurance purposes” appears to 
include functions beyond the FDIC‟s responsibility to administer the Deposit Insurance Fund 
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(“DIF”) for banks and thrifts.79  Dodd-Frank bars the FDIC from using the DIF to assist the OLF 
or from using the OLF to assist the DIF.
80
  However, the FDIC could conceivably assert that it 
has authority to borrow up to $100 billion from the Treasury under § 1824(a) for the “insurance 
purpose” of financing an orderly liquidation of a SIFI outside the normal funding parameters of 
the OLF. Assuming that such supplemental borrowing authority is available to the FDIC, the 
FDIC could use that authority to protect a SIFI‟s uninsured and unsecured creditors as long as 
such protection “maximizes” the value of the SIFI‟s assets or “mitigates the potential for serious 
adverse effects to the financial system.”81 
The “systemic risk exception” (“SRE”) to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (“FDIA”) 
provides a further potential source of funding to protect creditors of failed SIFIs.
82
  Under the 
SRE, the Treasury Secretary can authorize the FDIC to provide full protection to uninsured 
creditors of a bank in order to avoid or mitigate “serious effects on economic conditions or 
financial stability.”83  Dodd-Frank amended and narrowed the SRE by requiring that a bank must 
be placed in receivership in order for the bank‟s creditors to receive extraordinary protection 
under the SRE.
84
  Thus, if a failing SIFI owned a bank that was placed in receivership, the SRE 
would permit the FDIC (with the Treasury Secretary‟s approval) to provide full protection to 
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creditors of that bank in order to avoid or mitigate systemic risk.  By protecting a SIFI-owned 
bank‟s creditors (which could include the SIFI itself), the FDIC could use the SRE to extend 
indirect support to the SIFI‟s creditors.  
Two provisions of Dodd-Frank limit the authority of the FRB and the FDIC to provide 
financial support to failing SIFIs or their subsidiary banks outside the OLA or the SRE.  First, 
§1101 of Dodd-Frank provides that the FRB may not extend emergency secured loans under 
§13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act
85
 except to solvent firms that are “participant[s] in any 
program or facility with broad-based eligibility” that has been approved by the Treasury 
Secretary and reported to Congress.
86
  Second, § 1105 of Dodd-Frank forbids the FDIC from 
guaranteeing debt obligations of depository institutions or their holding companies or other 
affiliates except pursuant to a “widely available program” for “solvent” institutions that has been 
approved by the Treasury Secretary and endorsed by a joint resolution of Congress.
87
   
In light of the foregoing constraints, it is difficult to envision how the FRB or the FDIC 
could provide loans or debt guarantees to individual failing SIFIs or their subsidiary banks under 
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§ 1101 or § 1105 of Dodd-Frank.
88
  However, the FRB could conceivably use its remaining 
authority under § 13(3) to create a “broad-based” program similar to the Primary Dealer Credit 
Facility (“PDCF”) in order to provide emergency liquidity assistance to a selected group of 
LCFIs that the FRB deems to be “solvent.”89 As shown by the events of 2008, it is extremely 
difficult for outsiders (including members of Congress) to second-guess a regulator‟s 
determination of solvency in the midst of a systemic crisis. Moreover, regulators are strongly 
inclined during a crisis to make generous assessments of solvency in order to justify their 
decision to provide emergency assistance to troubled LCFIs.
90
  Thus, during a financial crisis the 
FRB could potentially assert its authority under amended § 13(3) to provide emergency loans to 
a targeted group of troubled LCFIs that it claimed to be “solvent.” 
Moreover, Dodd-Frank does not limit the ability of individual LCFIs to receive liquidity 
support from the FRB‟s discount window or from Federal Home Loan Banks (“FHLBs”). The 
FRB‟s discount window (often referred to as the FRB‟s “lender of last resort” facility) provides 
short-term loans to depository institutions secured by qualifying collateral.  Similarly, FHLBs – 
sometimes described as “lender[s] of next-to-last resort” – provide collateralized advances to 
member institutions, including banks and insurance companies.
91
   
During the financial crisis, banks did not borrow significant amounts from the discount 
window due to (i) the perceived “stigma” of doing so and (ii) the availability of alternative 
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sources of credit through FHLBs and several emergency liquidity facilities that the FRB 
established under its § 13(3) authority.  The FHLBs provided $235 billion of advances to 
member institutions during the second half of 2007, following the outbreak of the financial crisis.  
During that period, FHLBs extended almost $150 billion of advances to ten major LCFIs.  Six of 
those LCFIs incurred large losses during the crisis and failed, were acquired in emergency 
transactions, or received “exceptional assistance” from the federal government.  Accordingly, 
FHLB advances provided a significant source of support for troubled LCFIs, especially during 
the early phase of the financial crisis.  During future crises, it seems likely that individual LCFIs 
will use the FRB‟s discount window more frequently, along with FHLB advances, because 
Dodd-Frank prevents the FRB from providing emergency credit to individual institutions under § 
13(3).
92
 
 Discount window loans and FHLB advances cannot be made to banks in receivership, 
but they do provide a potential source of funding for troubled SIFIs or SIFI-owned banks as long 
as that funding is extended prior to the appointment of a receiver for either the bank or the SIFI.  
To the extent that the FRB or FHLBs provide such funding, at least some short-term creditors of 
troubled SIFIs or SIFI-owned banks are likely to benefit by obtaining full payment of their 
claims before any receivership is created.
 93
 
Thus, notwithstanding Dodd-Frank‟s explicit promise to end bailouts of SIFIs, federal 
agencies retain several powers that will permit them to protect creditors of weakened SIFIs.  A 
more fundamental problem is that Dodd-Frank‟s “no bailout” pledge does not bind future 
Congresses.  When a future Congress confronts the next systemic financial crisis, that Congress 
may well decide to abandon Dodd-Frank‟s “no bailout” position either explicitly (by amending 
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or repealing the statute) or implicitly (by looking the other way while regulators expansively 
construe their authority to protect creditors of SIFIs).  For example, Congress and President 
George H.W. Bush made “never again” statements when they rescued the thrift industry with 
taxpayer funds in 1989, but those statements did not prevent Congress and President George W. 
Bush from using public funds to bail out major financial institutions in 2008.
94
  As Adam Levitin 
has observed:  
Law is an insufficient commitment device for avoiding bailouts altogether.  It is 
impossible to produce binding commitment to a preset resolution process, irrespective of 
the results.  The financial Ulysses cannot be bound to the mast. . . . Once the ship is 
foundering, we do not want Ulysses to be bound to the mast, lest [we] go down with the 
ship and drown.  Instead, we want to be sure his hands are free – too bail.95 
 
Similarly, Cheryl Block has concluded that “despite all the . . . „no more taxpayer-funded 
bailout‟ clamor included in recent financial reform legislation, bailouts in the future are likely if 
circumstances become sufficiently severe.”96  Accordingly, there is a substantial probability that 
future Congresses will relax or remove Dodd-Frank‟s constraints on TBTF bailouts, or will 
permit federal regulators to evade those limitations, if such actions are deemed necessary to 
prevent failures of SIFIs that could destabilize our financial system.
97
 
c.   Dodd-Frank Subjects SIFIs to Enhanced Supervisory Standards, But Those 
Provisions Are Not Likely to Prevent Future Bailouts of SIFIs  
 
 Dodd-Frank provides the FRB with consolidated supervision and enforcement authority 
over nonbank SIFIs comparable to the FRB‟s umbrella supervisory and enforcement powers with 
respect to BHCs and financial holding companies (“FHCs”).  Dodd-Frank also requires the FRB 
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(either on its own motion or on FSOC‟s recommendation) to adopt enhanced prudential 
standards for nonbank SIFIs and large BHCs “[i]n order to prevent or mitigate risks to the 
financial stability of the United States.”98  The enhanced standards must be “more stringent” than 
the ordinary supervisory rules that apply to nonbank financial companies and BHCs that are not 
SIFIs.
99
   
Dodd-Frank requires the FRB to adopt enhanced risk-based capital requirements, 
leverage limits, liquidity requirements, overall risk management rules, risk concentration limits, 
requirements for resolution plans (“living wills”) and credit exposure reports.  In addition, the 
FRB may, in its discretion, require SIFIs to satisfy contingent capital requirements, enhanced 
public disclosures, short-term debt limits, and additional prudential standards.
100
  
It may be very difficult for SIFIs to reach agreement with outside investors on terms for 
contingent capital that are mutually satisfactory.  Institutional investors are not likely to purchase 
debt securities that will be compelled to convert into equity stock when an SIFI is in trouble 
unless those convertible debt securities offer comparatively high yields and/or other investor-
friendly features that may not be attractive to LCFIs.
101
   
Whether or not contingent capital proves to be a feasible option for attracting investment 
by outside investors, I believe that contingent capital should become a significant component of 
future compensation packages for senior managers and other key employees (e.g., risk managers 
and traders) of LCFIs.  In contrast to outside investors, senior managers and key employees are 
“captive investors” who can be required, as a condition of their continued employment, to accept 
convertible subordinated debentures in payment of a significant portion (e.g., one-third) of their 
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annual compensation. Managers and key employees should not be allowed to make voluntary 
conversions of their subordinated debentures into common stock until the expiration of a 
minimum holding period (e.g., three years) after the termination date of their employment. Such 
a minimum post-employment holding period would discourage managers and key employees 
from taking excessive risks to boost the value of the conversion option during the term of their 
employment.  At the same time, their debentures should be subject to mandatory conversion into 
common stock upon the occurrence of a designated “triggering” event of financial distress. 
Requiring managers and key employees to hold a significant portion of contingent capital could 
give them positive incentives to manage their LCFI prudently in accordance with the interests of 
creditors as well as longer-term shareholders.  Such a requirement would also force managers 
and key employees to share a significant portion of the loss if their LCFI is threatened with 
failure.
102
  
Dodd-Frank‟s provisions requiring consolidated FRB supervision and enhanced 
prudential standards for SIFIs represent valuable improvements.  For at least five reasons, 
however, those provisions are unlikely to prevent future failures of SIFIs with the attendant risk 
of governmental bailouts for systemically significant creditors.  First, like previous regulatory 
reforms, Dodd-Frank relies heavily on the concept of stronger capital requirements.  
Unfortunately, capital-based regulation has repeatedly failed in the past.
103
  As regulators learned 
during the banking and thrift crises of the 1980s and early 1990s, capital levels are “lagging 
indicators” of bank problems104 because (i) “many assets held by banks . . . are not traded on any 
organized market and, therefore, are very difficult for regulators and outside investors to value,” 
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and (ii) bank managers “have strong incentives to postpone any recognition of asset depreciation 
and capital losses” until their banks have already suffered serious damage.105 
Second, LCFIs have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to engage in “regulatory capital 
arbitrage” in order to weaken the effectiveness of capital requirements.106  For example, the 
Basel II international capital accord was designed to prevent the arbitrage techniques (including 
securitization) that banks used to undermine the effectiveness of the Basel I accord.
107
  However, 
many analysts concluded that the Basel II accord (including its heavy reliance on internal risk-
based models developed by LCFIs) contained significant flaws and allowed LCFIs to operate 
with seriously inadequate capital levels during the period leading up to the financial crisis.
108
   
Third, the past shortcomings of capital-based rules are part of a broader phenomenon of 
supervisory failure.  Regulators did not stop large banks from pursuing hazardous (and in many 
cases fatal) strategies during the 1980s, including rapid growth with heavy concentrations in 
high-risk assets and excessive reliance on volatile, short-term liabilities. During the 1980s, 
regulators proved to be unwilling or unable to stop risky behavior as long as banks continued to 
report profits.
109
 Similarly, there is wide agreement that federal banking and securities regulators 
failed to restrain excessive risk-taking by LCFIs during the two decades leading up to the 
financial crisis.
110
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Fourth, repeated regulatory failures during past financial crises reflect a “political 
economy of regulation”111 in which regulators face significant political and practical challenges 
that undermine their efforts to discipline LCFIs.  A full discussion of those challenges is beyond 
the scope of this testimony.  For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that analysts have 
pointed to strong evidence of “capture” of financial regulatory agencies by LCFIs during the two 
decades leading up to the financial crisis, due to factors such as (i) large political contributions 
made by LCFIs, (ii) an intellectual and policy environment favoring deregulation, and (iii) a 
continuous interchange of senior personnel between the largest financial institutions and the top 
echelons of the financial regulatory agencies.
112
 Commentators have also noted that LCFIs 
skillfully engaged in global regulatory arbitrage by threatening to move operations from the U.S. 
to London or other foreign financial centers if U.S. regulators did not make regulatory 
concessions.
113
  
Fifth, Dodd-Frank does not provide specific instructions about the higher capital 
requirements and other enhanced prudential standards that the FRB must adopt.  Instead, Dodd-
Frank sets forth general categories of supervisory requirements that the FRB either must or may 
address. Thus, the actual achievement of stronger prudential standards will depend upon 
implementation by the FRB through rulemaking, and LCFIs have marshaled an imposing array 
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of lobbying resources to persuade the FRB to adopt more lenient rules.
114
  When Congress 
passed Dodd-Frank, the head of a leading Wall Street trade association declared that “[t]he 
bottom line is that this saga will continue,” and he noted that there are “more than 200 items in 
[Dodd-Frank]l where final details will be left up to regulators.”115 Domestic and foreign LCFIs 
have already succeeded in weakening and delaying the imposition of enhanced capital standards 
under the Basel III accord, and they are determined to prevent U.S. regulators from adopting 
stronger capital requirements that would go beyond Basel III.
116
  
For all of the foregoing reasons, as John Coffee has noted, “the intensity of regulatory 
supervision is likely to follow a sine curve: tight regulation after a crash, followed by gradual 
relaxation thereafter” as the economy improves and the crisis fades in the memories of regulators 
and the public.
117
  When the next economic boom occurs, regulators will face escalating political 
pressures to reduce the regulatory burden on LCFIs in order to help those institutions continue to 
finance the boom. Accordingly, while Dodd-Frank‟s provisions for stronger supervision and 
enhanced prudential standards represent improvements over prior law, they are unlikely to 
prevent future failures of SIFIs and the accompanying pressures for governmental protection of 
systemically important creditors.
118
  
d. Dodd-Frank Does Not Require SIFIs to Pay Insurance Premiums to Pre-Fund the 
Orderly Liquidation Fund 
 
 As noted above, Dodd-Frank establishes an Orderly Liquidation Fund (“OLF”) to provide 
financing for the FDIC‟s liquidation of failed SIFIs.  However, Dodd-Frank does not require 
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LCFIs to pay any assessments to pre-fund the OLF.  Instead, Dodd-Frank authorizes the FDIC to 
borrow from the Treasury to provide the necessary funding for the OLF after a SIFI is placed in 
receivership.
119
  
 The FDIC must normally repay any borrowings from the Treasury within five years, but 
the Treasury may extend the repayment period in order “to avoid a serious adverse effect on the 
financial system of the United States.”120  Dodd-Frank authorizes the FDIC to repay borrowings 
from the Treasury by making ex post assessments on (i) creditors who received preferential 
payments (to the extent of such preferences), (ii) nonbank SIFIs supervised by the FRB under 
Dodd-Frank, (iii) BHCs with assets of $50 billion or more, and (iii) other financial companies 
with assets of $50 billion or more.
121
   
 Thus, Dodd-Frank relies on an ex post funding system for financing liquidations of SIFIs.  
That was not the case with early versions of the legislation.  The financial reform bill passed by 
the House of Representatives would have authorized the FDIC to pre-fund the OLF by collecting 
up to $150 billion in risk-based assessments from nonbank SIFIs and large BHCs.  The bill 
reported by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs would also have 
established a pre-funded OLF, albeit with a smaller “target size” of $50 billion.  FDIC Chairman 
Sheila Bair strongly championed the concept of a pre-funded OLF.
122
 
 Senate Republicans repeatedly blocked consideration of the financial reform bill on the 
Senate floor until Senate Democrats agreed to remove the pre-funding provision.  The Obama 
Administration never supported the pre-funding mechanism and urged Senate leaders to remove 
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it from the bill.  During the House-Senate conference committee‟s deliberations on Dodd-Frank, 
House Democratic conferees tried to revive the pre-funding mechanism but their efforts failed.
123
   
It is contrary to customary insurance principles to establish an OLF that is funded only 
after a SIFI fails and must be liquidated.
124
  When commentators have considered analogous 
insurance issues created by the DIF, they have recognized that moral hazard is reduced when 
banks pay risk-based premiums that compel “each bank [to] bear the cost of its own risk-
taking.”125 No one advocates a post-funded DIF today; indeed, analysts have generally argued 
that the DIF needs a higher level of pre-funding in order to respond adequately to systemic 
banking crises.
126
  
In stark contrast to the FDI Act – which requires banks to pay deposit insurance 
premiums to pre-fund the DIF – Dodd-Frank does not require SIFIs to pay risk-based premiums 
to pre-fund the OLF.  As a result, SIFIs receive an implicit subsidy and benefit from lower 
funding costs due to the protection their creditors expect to receive from the Treasury-backed 
OLF.  SIFIs will pay nothing for that subsidy until the first SIFI fails.
127
  Not surprisingly, LCFIs 
viewed the removal of pre-funding for the OLF from the Dodd-Frank Act as a significant 
“victory,” because it relieved them of the burden of paying an “upfront fee” to cover the 
potential costs of their implicit subsidy.
128
 
                                                 
123 Id. at 1016-17. 
124
  See  Carnell, Macey & Miller, supra note 14, at 535 (noting that ordinarily “an insurer collects, pools, 
and invests policyholders‟ premiums and draws on that pool to pay policyholders‟ claims”).   
125
 Id. at 328. 
126
 See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya, Joao A.C. Santos & Tanju Yorulmazer, “Systemic Risk and Deposit 
Insurance Premiums,” Economic Policy Review (Fed. Res. Bank of NY, Aug. 2010), at 89. 
127
 Wilmarth, “Dodd-Frank,” supra note 5, at 1017.  
128
 Mike Ferrulo, “Regulatory Reform: Democrats Set to Begin Final Push to Enact Dodd-Frank Financial 
Overhaul,” 94 Banking Report (BNA) 1277 (June 29, 2010) (reporting that the elimination of a pre-
funded OLF “is seen as a victory for large financial institutions,” and quoting analyst Jaret Seiberg‟s 
comment that “[t]he key for [the financial services] industry was to avoid the upfront fee”). 
 37 
The Congressional Budget Office estimated that Dodd-Frank would produce a ten-year 
net budget deficit of $19 billion, due primarily to “potential net outlays for the orderly 
liquidation of [SIFIs}, measured on an expected value basis.”129  To offset that deficit, the 
House-Senate conferees proposed a $19 billion tax on financial companies with assets of $50 
billion or more and on hedge funds with managed assets of $10 billion or more.  LCFIs strongly 
objected to the tax, and Republicans who had voted for the Senate bill threatened to block final 
passage of the legislation unless the tax was removed.  To ensure Dodd-Frank‟s passage, the 
House-Senate conference committee reconvened and removed the $19 billion tax while 
substituting other measures that effectively shifted most of the legislation‟s estimated net cost to 
taxpayers and midsized banks.
130
  
Thus, LCFIs and their allies were successful in defeating the $19 billion tax as well as the 
pre-funded OLF.  As I observed in a contemporaneous blog post, “[t]he biggest banks have once 
again proven their political clout . . . [and] have also avoided any significant payment for the 
subsidies they continue to receive.”131   
      A pre-funded OLF is essential to shrink TBTF subsidies for LCFIs.  The FDIC should 
assess risk-adjusted premiums over a period of several years to establish a pre-funded OLF with 
financial resources that would provide reasonable protection to taxpayers against the cost of 
resolving failures of SIFIs during a future systemic financial crisis. As noted above, federal 
regulators provided $290 billion of capital assistance to the 19 largest BHCs – each with assets 
of more than $100 billion – and to AIG during the current crisis.  Accordingly, $300 billion 
                                                 
129
 Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate, H.R. 4173: Restoring Financial Stability Act of 2010: As 
passed by the Senate on May 20, 2010 (June 9, 2010), at 6. 
130
  Wilmarth, “Dodd-Frank,” supra  note 5, at 1018, 1018-19 n.287. 
131
 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “Too Big to Fail=Too Powerful to Pay,” Credit Slips (blog post on July 7, 
2010), available at http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2010/07/too-big-to-fail-too-powerful-to-
pay.html#more. 
 38 
(appropriately adjusted for inflation) would be the minimum acceptable size for a pre-funded 
OLF, and OLF premiums should be paid by all BHCs with assets of more than $100 billion (also 
adjusted for inflation) and by all designated nonbank SIFIs.  The FDIC should impose additional 
assessments on SIFIs in order to replenish the OLF within three years after the OLF incurs any 
loss due to the failure of a SIFI.
 132
   
There are four essential reasons why Congress should amend Dodd-Frank to require 
SIFIs to pay risk-based insurance premiums to pre-fund the OLF.  First, it is unlikely that most 
SIFIs would have adequate financial resources to pay large OLF assessments after one or more 
of their peers failed during a financial crisis.  SIFIs are frequently exposed to highly correlated 
risk exposures during a serious financial disruption, because they followed similar high-risk 
business strategies (“herding”) during the credit boom that led to the crisis.  Many SIFIs are 
therefore likely to suffer severe losses and to face a substantial risk of failure during a major 
disturbance in the financial markets.  Consequently, the FDIC (i) probably will not be able in the 
short term to collect enough premiums from surviving SIFIs to cover the costs of resolving one 
or more failed SIFIs, and (ii) therefore will have to borrow large sums from the Treasury to cover 
short-term resolution costs.  Even if the FDIC ultimately repays the borrowed funds by imposing 
ex post assessments on surviving SIFIs, the public and the financial markets will rightly 
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conclude that the federal government (and, ultimately, the taxpayers) provided bridge loans to 
pay the creditors of failed SIFIs.
133
  
Second, under Dodd-Frank‟s post-funded OLF, the most reckless SIFIs will effectively 
shift the potential costs of their risk-taking to the most prudent SIFIs, because the latter will be 
more likely to survive and bear the ex post costs of resolving their failed peers. Thus, a post-
funded OLF is undesirable because “firms that fail never pay and the costs are borne by 
surviving firms.”134 
Third, a pre-funded OLF would encourage each SIFI to monitor other SIFIs and to alert 
regulators to excessive risk-taking by those institutions. Every SIFI would know that the failure 
of another SIFI would deplete the OLF and would also trigger future assessments that it and 
other surviving SIFIs would have to pay. Thus, each SIFI would have good reason to complain to 
regulators if it became aware of unsound practices or conditions at another SIFI.
135
 
Fourth, the payment of risk-based assessments to pre-fund the OLF would reduce TBTF 
subsidies for SIFIs by forcing them to internalize more of the “negative externality” (i.e., the 
potential public bailout cost) of their activities.  A pre-funded OLF would provide a reserve fund, 
paid for by SIFIs, which would shield governments and taxpayers from having to incur the 
expense of underwriting future resolutions of failed SIFIs.
136
  Jeffrey Gordon and Christopher 
Muller also point out that a pre-funded OLF would reduce the TBTF subsidy by making Dodd-
Frank‟s “liquidation threat more credible.”137 In their view, a pre-funded OLF would encourage 
regulators to “impos[e] an FDIC receivership” on a failing SIFI.138  In contrast, Dodd-Frank‟s 
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post-funded OLF creates a strong incentive for regulators to grant forbearance in order to avoid 
or postpone the politically unpopular step of borrowing from the Treasury to finance a failed 
SIFI‟s liquidation.139 
To further reduce the potential TBTF subsidy for SIFIs, the OLF should be strictly 
separated from the DIF, which insures bank deposits. As discussed above, the “systemic-risk 
exception” (“SRE”) in the FDI Act is a potential source of bailout funds for SIFI-owned banks, 
and those funds could indirectly support creditors of SIFIs.
140
  Congress should repeal the SRE 
and should designate the OLF as the exclusive source of future funding for all resolutions of 
failed SIFIs.  By repealing the SRE, Congress would ensure that (i) the FDIC must apply the FDI 
Act‟s least-cost test in resolving all future bank failures, (ii) the DIF must be used solely to pay 
the claims of bank depositors, and (iii) non-deposit creditors of SIFIs could no longer view the 
DIF as a potential source of financial support.  By making those changes, Congress would 
significantly reduce the implicit TBTF subsidy currently enjoyed by SIFIs.
141
 
e.   The Dodd-Frank Act Does Not Prevent Financial Holding Companies from Using 
Federal Safety Net Subsidies to Support Risky Nonbanking Activities  
 
Dodd-Frank contains three sections that are intended to prevent the federal “safety net” 
for banks
142
 from being used to support risky nonbanking activities connected to the capital 
markets.  As discussed below, none of those sections is likely to be effective.  The first provision 
(the Kanjorski Amendment) is unwieldy and constrained by stringent procedural requirements.  
The other two provisions (the Volcker Rule and the Lincoln Amendment) are riddled with 
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loopholes and have long phase-in periods.  In addition, the implementation of all three provisions 
is subject to broad regulatory discretion and is therefore likely to be influenced by aggressive 
industry lobbying. 
(a) The Kanjorski Amendment 
Section 121 of Dodd-Frank, the “Kanjorski Amendment,” was originally sponsored by 
Representative Paul Kanjorski.  Section 121 provides the FRB with potential authority to require 
large BHCs (with more than $50 billion of assets) or nonbank SIFIs to divest high-risk 
operations.   However, the FRB may exercise its divestiture authority under § 121 only if (i) the 
BHC or nonbank SIFI “poses a grave threat to the financial stability of the United States” and (ii) 
the FRB‟s proposed action is approved by at least two-thirds of FSOC‟s voting members.143 
Additionally, the FRB may not exercise its divestiture authority unless it has previously 
attempted to “mitigate” the threat posed by the BHC or nonbank SIFI by taking several, less 
drastic remedial measures.
144
  If, and only if, the FRB determines that all of those remedial 
measures are “inadequate to mitigate [the] threat,” the FRB may then exercise its residual 
authority to “require the company to sell or otherwise transfer assets or off-balance-sheet items 
to unaffiliated parties.”145   
 The FRB‟s divestiture authority under § 121 is thus a last resort, and it is restricted by 
numerous procedural requirements (including, most notably, a two-thirds FSOC vote).  The 
Bank Holding Company Act (“BHC Act”) contains a similar provision, under which the FRB 
can force a BHC to divest a nonbank subsidiary that “constitutes a serious risk to the financial 
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safety, soundness or stability” of any of the BHC‟s banking subsidiaries.146  The FRB may 
exercise its divestiture authority under the BHC Act without the concurrence of any other federal 
agency, and the FRB is not required to take any intermediate remedial steps before requiring a 
divestiture.  However, according to a senior Federal Reserve official, the FRB‟s divestiture 
authority under the BHC Act “has never been successfully used for a major banking 
organization.”147 In view of the much greater procedural and substantive constraints on the 
FRB‟s authority under the Kanjorski Amendment, the prospects for an FRB-ordered breakup of a 
SIFI seem remote at best.   
(b) The Volcker Rule 
Section 619 of Dodd-Frank, the “Volcker Rule,” was originally proposed by former FRB 
Chairman Paul Volcker.
148
 As approved by the Senate Banking Committee, the Volcker Rule 
would have generally barred banks and BHCs from (i) sponsoring or investing in hedge funds or 
private equity funds and (ii) engaging in proprietary trading – i.e., buying and selling securities, 
derivatives and other tradable assets for their own account.  Thus, the Volcker Rule sought to 
prohibit equity investments and trading activities by banks and BHCs except for “market 
making” activities conducted on behalf of clients.149  
The Senate committee report explained that the Volcker Rule would prevent banks 
“protected by the federal safety net, which have a lower cost of funds, from directing those funds 
to high-risk uses.”150  The report endorsed Mr. Volcker‟s view that public policy does not favor 
having “public funds – taxpayer funds – protecting and supporting essentially proprietary and 
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speculative activities.”151  The report further declared that the Volcker Rule was directed at 
“limiting the inappropriate transfer of economic subsidies” by banks and “reducing inappropriate 
conflicts of interest between [banks] and their affiliates.”152  Thus, the Senate report made clear 
that a primary goal of the Volcker Rule was to prevent banks from spreading their federal safety 
net subsidies to nonbank affiliates engaged in capital markets activities. 
LCFIs vehemently opposed the Volcker Rule as embodied in the Senate committee 
bill.
153
  However, the Volcker Rule – and the financial reform bill as a whole – gained significant 
political momentum from two events related to Goldman.  First, the SEC filed a lawsuit on April 
16, 2010, alleging that Goldman defrauded two institutional purchasers of interests in a CDO that 
Goldman structured and marketed. The SEC charged that Goldman did not disclose to the 
CDO‟s investors that a large hedge fund, Paulson & Co., helped to select the CDO‟s portfolio of 
MBS while intending to short the CDO by purchasing CDS from Goldman. The SEC alleged that 
Goldman knew, and did not disclose, that Paulson & Co. had an “economic incentive” to select 
MBS that it expected to default within the near-term future.  The institutional investors in the 
CDO lost more than $1 billion, while Paulson & Co. reaped a corresponding gain.  Goldman 
subsequently settled the SEC‟s lawsuit by paying restitution and penalties of $550 million.154     
Second, on April 27, 2010, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Oversight 
interrogated Goldman‟s chairman and several of Goldman‟s other current and former officers 
during an eleven-hour hearing. The Subcommittee also released a report charging, based on 
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internal Goldman documents, that Goldman aggressively sold nonprime mortgage-backed 
investments to clients in late 2006 and 2007 while Goldman was “making huge and profitable 
bets against the housing market and acting against the interest of its clients.”  The allegations 
against Goldman presented in the SEC‟s lawsuit and at the Senate hearing provoked widespread 
public outrage and gave a major political boost to the Volcker Rule and the reform legislation as 
a whole.
155
   
Nevertheless, large financial institutions continued their aggressive lobbying campaign to 
weaken the Volcker rule during the conference committee‟s deliberations on the final terms of 
Dodd-Frank. The conference committee accepted a last-minute compromise that significantly 
weakened the Volcker Rule and “disappointed” Mr. Volcker.156  The final compromise inserted 
exemptions in the Volcker Rule that allow banks and BHCs (i) to invest up to 3% of their Tier 1 
capital in hedge funds or private equity funds (as long as a bank‟s investments do not exceed 3% 
of the total ownership interests in any single fund), (ii) purchase and sell government securities, 
(iii) engage in “risk-mitigating hedging activities,” (iv) make investments through insurance 
company affiliates, and (v) make small business investment company investments.  The 
compromise also delayed the Volcker Rule‟s effective date so that banks and BHCs will have 
(A) up to seven years after Dodd-Frank‟s enactment date to bring most of their equity investing 
and proprietary trading activities into compliance with the Volcker Rule, and (B) up to twelve 
years to bring “illiquid” investments that were in existence on May 1, 2010, into compliance 
with the Rule.
157
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Probably the most troublesome aspect of the Volcker Rule is that the Rule attempts to 
distinguish between prohibited “proprietary trading” and permissible “market making.”  The 
Rule defines “proprietary trading” as “engaging as a principal for the trading account of the 
banking entity,” but the Rule allows “[t]he purchase, sale, acquisition, or disposition of securities 
and other instruments . . . on behalf of customers.”158  Distinguishing between proprietary trading 
and market making is notoriously difficult,
159
 and analysts predict that large Wall Street banks 
will seek to evade the Volcker Rule by shifting their trading operations into so-called “client-
related businesses.”160 Moreover, the parameters of “proprietary trading,” “market making” and 
other ambiguous terms in the Volcker Rule – including the exemption for “[r]isk-mitigating 
hedging activities”161 – are yet to be determined.  Those terms will be defined in regulations to 
be issued jointly by the federal banking agencies, the CFTC and the SEC.
162
  
Mr. Volcker has urged regulators to adopt “[c]lear and concise definitions [and] firmly 
worded prohibitions” to carry out “the basic intent” of § 619.163 However, LCFIs have deployed 
formidable political and regulatory influence in pursuit of the opposite result.
164
 Given the 
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Volcker Rule‟s ambiguous terms and numerous exemptions that rely on regulatory 
implementation, as well as its long phase-in period, many commentators believe that the Rule 
probably will not have a significant impact in restraining risk-taking by major banks or in 
preventing them from exploiting their safety net subsidies to fund speculative activities.
165
 
(c) The Lincoln Amendment 
Section 726 of Dodd-Frank, the “Lincoln Amendment,” was originally sponsored by 
Senator Blanche Lincoln.  In April 2010, Senator Lincoln, as chair of the Senate Agriculture 
Committee, included the Lincoln Amendment in derivatives reform legislation, which was 
passed by the Agriculture Committee and subsequently was combined with the Senate Banking 
Committee‟s regulatory reform bill. As adopted by the Agriculture Committee, the Lincoln 
Amendment would have barred dealers in swaps and other OTC derivatives from receiving 
assistance from the DIF or from the Fed‟s discount window or other emergency lending 
facilities.
166
  
Senator Lincoln designed the provision to force major banks to “spin off their derivatives 
operations” in order “to prevent a situation in which a bank‟s derivatives deals failed and forced 
taxpayers to bail out the institution.”167  The Lincoln Amendment was “also an effort to crack 
down on the possibility that banks would use cheaper funding provided by deposits insured by 
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the FDIC, to subsidize their trading activities.”168  Thus, the purposes of the Lincoln Amendment 
– insulating banks from the risks of speculative activities and preventing the spread of safety net 
subsidies – were similar to the objectives of the Volcker Rule, but the Lincoln Amendment 
focused on dealing and trading in derivatives instead of all types of proprietary trading.
169
     
The Lincoln Amendment provoked “tremendous pushback . . . from Republicans, fellow 
Democrats, the White House, banking regulators, and Wall Street interests.”170 Large banks 
claimed that the provision would require them to furnish more than $100 billion of additional 
capital to organize separate derivatives trading subsidiaries.
171
 A prominent industry analyst 
opined that the provision “eliminates all of the advantages of the affiliation with an insured 
depository institution, which are profound.”172 Those statements reflect a common understanding 
that, as discussed below, bank dealers in OTC derivatives enjoy significant competitive 
advantages over nonbank dealers due to the banks‟ explicit and implicit safety net subsidies.  The 
Lincoln Amendment was specifically intended to remove those advantages and to force major 
banks to conduct their derivatives trading operations without reliance on federal subsidies.
173
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As was true with the Volcker Rule, the House-Senate conference committee agreed to a 
final compromise that significantly weakened the Lincoln Amendment.
174
  As enacted, the 
Lincoln Amendment allows an FDIC-insured bank to act as a swaps dealer with regard to (i) 
“[h]edging and other similar risk mitigating activities directly related to the [bank‟s] activities,” 
(ii) swaps involving interest rates, currency rates and other “reference assets that are permissible 
for investment by a national bank,” including gold and silver but not other types of metals, 
energy, or agricultural commodities, and (iii) credit default swaps that are cleared pursuant to 
Dodd-Frank and carry investment-grade ratings.
175
  In addition, the Lincoln Amendment allows 
banks up to five years to divest or spin off nonconforming derivatives operations into separate 
affiliates.
176
  
Analysts estimate that the compromised Lincoln Amendment will require major banks to 
spin off only ten to twenty percent of their existing derivatives activities into separate 
affiliates.
177
  In addition, banks will able to argue for retention of derivatives that are used for 
“hedging” purposes, an open-ended standard that will require much elaboration by regulators.178 
As in the case of the Volcker Rule, commentators concluded that the Lincoln Amendment was 
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“greatly diluted,”179 “significantly weakened,”180 and “watered down,”181 with the result that “the 
largest banks‟ [derivatives] operations are largely left intact.”182  
The requirement that bank must clear their trades of CDS in order to be exempt from the 
Lincoln Amendment is potentially significant.
183
  However, there is no clearing requirement for 
other derivatives (e.g., interest and currency rate swaps) that reference assets permissible for 
investment by national banks (“bank-eligible” derivatives).  Consequently, banks may continue 
to trade and deal in OTC derivatives (except for CDS) without restriction under the Lincoln 
Amendment if those derivatives are bank-eligible.
184
 In addition, as discussed above, all 
“proprietary trading” by banks in derivatives must comply with the Volcker Rule as 
implemented by regulators. 
4. Banks Controlled by Financial Holding Companies Should Operate as “Narrow 
Banks” so that They Cannot Transfer Their Federal Safety Net Subsidies to Their 
Nonbank Affiliates  
 
As explained above, a fundamental purpose of the Volcker Rule and the Lincoln 
Amendment is to prevent LCFIs from using federal safety net subsidies to support their 
speculative activities in the capital markets. As enacted, however, both provisions have 
numerous gaps and exemptions that undermine their stated purpose.   
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As shown below, a highly effective way to prevent the spread of federal safety net 
subsidies from banks to their affiliates involved in the capital markets would be to create a two-
tiered structure of bank regulation and deposit insurance. The first tier of “traditional” banking 
organizations would provide a relatively broad range of banking-related services, but those 
organizations would not be allowed to engage, or affiliate with firms engaged, in securities 
underwriting or dealing, insurance underwriting, or derivatives dealing or trading.  In contrast, 
the second tier of “narrow banks” could affiliate with “nontraditional” financial conglomerates 
engaged in capital markets activities (except for private equity investments).  However, “narrow 
banks” would be prohibited from making any extensions of credit or other transfers of funds to 
their nonbank affiliates, except for lawful dividends paid to their parent holding companies. The 
“narrow bank” approach provides the most politically feasible approach for ensuring that banks 
cannot transfer their safety net subsidies to affiliated companies engaged in speculative activities 
in the capital markets, and it is therefore consistent with the objectives of both the Volcker Rule 
and the Lincoln Amendment.
185
 
a. The First Tier of Traditional Banking Organizations 
Under my proposal, the first tier of regulated banking firms would be “traditional” 
banking organizations that limit their activities (including the activities of all holding company 
affiliates) to lines of business that satisfy the ”closely related to banking” test under Section 
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4(c)(8) of the BHC Act.
186
  For example, this first tier of traditional banks could take deposits, 
make loans, offer fiduciary services, and act as agents in selling securities, mutual funds and 
insurance products underwritten by non-affiliated firms. Additionally, they could underwrite and 
deal solely in “bank-eligible” securities that national banks are permitted to underwrite and deal 
in directly.
187
 First-tier banking organizations could also purchase, as end-users, derivatives 
transactions that (i) hedge against their own firm-specific risks, and (ii) qualify for hedging 
treatment under Financial Accounting Standard (“FAS”) Statement No. 133.188  
Most first-tier banking firms would probably be small and midsized community-oriented 
banks.  In the past, those banks typically have not engaged as principal in insurance 
underwriting, securities underwriting or dealing, derivatives dealing or trading, or other capital 
markets activities.  Community banks should be encouraged to continue their primary business 
of attracting core deposits, providing “high touch,” relationship-based loans to consumers and to 
small and medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”), and offering wealth management and other 
fiduciary services to local customers.  (In sharp contrast to traditional community banks, TBTF 
megabanks provide impersonal, highly automated lending and deposit programs to SMEs and 
consumers, and megabanks also focus on complex, higher-risk transactions in the capital 
markets.)
189
  Traditional, first-tier banks and their holding companies should continue to operate 
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under their current supervisory arrangements, and all deposits of first-tier banks (up to the 
current statutory maximum of $250,000) should be covered by deposit insurance. 
 In order to provide reasonable flexibility to first-tier banking organizations, Congress 
should amend § 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act by permitting the FRB to expand the list of “closely 
related” activities that are permissible for holding company affiliates of traditional banks.190 
However, Congress should prohibit first-tier BHCs from engaging as principal in underwriting or 
dealing in securities, underwriting any type of insurance (except for credit insurance), dealing or 
trading in derivatives, or making private equity investments.  
b. The Second Tier of Nontraditional Banking Organizations 
 Unlike first-tier banking firms, the second tier of “nontraditional” banking organizations 
would be allowed to engage, through nonbank subsidiaries, in (i) underwriting and dealing (i.e., 
proprietary trading) in “bank-ineligible” securities,191 (ii) underwriting all types of insurance, and 
(iii) dealing and trading in derivatives.  Second-tier banking organizations would include: (A) 
FHCs registered under §§ 4(k) and 4(l) of the BHC Act,
192
 (B) holding companies owning 
grandfathered “nonbank banks,” and (C) grandfathered “unitary thrift” holding companies.193  In 
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addition, firms controlling industrial banks should be required either to register as FHCs or to 
divest their ownership of such banks if they cannot comply with the BHC Act‟s prohibition 
against commercial activities.
194
  Second-tier holding companies would thus encompass all of the 
largest banking organizations, most of which are heavily engaged in capital markets activities, as 
well as other financial conglomerates that control FDIC-insured depository institutions. 
i. Congress Should Require a “Narrow Bank” Structure for 
Second-Tier Banks     
 
 Under my proposal, FDIC-insured banks that are subsidiaries of second-tier holding 
companies would be required to operate as “narrow banks.” The purpose of the narrow bank 
structure would be to prevent a “nontraditional” second-tier holding company from transferring 
the bank‟s federal safety net subsidies to its nonbank affiliates.  
Narrow banks could offer FDIC-insured deposit accounts, including checking and 
savings accounts and certificates of deposit. Narrow banks would hold all of their assets in the 
form of cash and marketable, short-term debt obligations, including qualifying government 
securities, highly-rated commercial paper and other liquid, short-term debt instruments that are 
eligible for investment by money market mutual funds (“MMMFs”) under the SEC‟s rules. 
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111-176, at 83 (2010).  See also Wilmarth, “Wal-Mart,” supra note 193, at 1543-44, 1554–1620 (arguing 
that Congress should prohibit commercial firms from owning  industrial banks because such ownership 
(i) undermines the long-established U.S. policy of separating banking and commerce, (ii) threatens to 
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companies).  
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Narrow banks could not hold any other types of loans or investments, nor could they accept any 
uninsured deposits. Narrow banks would present a very small risk to the DIF, because (i) each 
narrow bank‟s non-cash assets would consist solely of short-term securities that could be 
“marked to market” on a daily basis, and the FDIC could therefore readily determine whether a 
narrow bank was threatened with insolvency, and (ii) the FDIC could promptly convert a narrow 
bank‟s assets into cash if the FDIC decided to liquidate the bank and pay off the claims of its 
insured depositors.
195
 
 Thus, narrow banks would effectively operate as FDIC-insured MMMFs. To prevent 
unfair competition with narrow banks, and to avoid future government bailouts of uninsured 
MMMFs, MMMFs should be prohibited from representing, either explicitly or implicitly, that 
they will redeem their shares based on a “constant net asset value” (“NAV”) of $1 per share. 
Currently, the MMMF industry (which manages about $3 trillion of assets) leads investors to 
believe that their funds will be available for withdrawal (redemption) based on “a stable price of 
$1 per share.”196  Not surprisingly, “the $1 share price gives investors the false impression that 
money-market funds are like [FDIC-insured] banks accounts and can‟t lose money.”197  
However, “[t]hat myth was shattered in 2008” when Lehman‟s default on its commercial paper 
caused Reserve Primary Fund (a large MMMF that invested heavily in Lehman‟s paper) to suffer 
large losses and to “break the buck.”198  Reserve Primary Fund‟s inability to redeem its shares 
based on a NAV of $1 per share caused an investor panic that precipitated runs on several 
MMMFs. The Treasury Department responded by establishing the Money Market Fund 
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Guarantee Program (“MMFGP”), which protected investors in participating MMMFs between 
October 2008 and September 2009.
199
  
 Critics of MMMFs maintain that the Treasury‟s MMFGP has created an expectation of 
similar government bailouts if MMMFs “break the buck” in the future.200 In addition, former 
FRB chairman Paul Volcker has argued that MMMFs weaken banks because of their ability to 
offer bank-like products without equivalent regulation. MMMFs typically offer accounts with 
check-writing features, and they provide returns to investors that are higher than bank checking 
accounts because MMMFs do not have to pay FDIC insurance premiums or to comply with other 
bank regulations.
201
 A Group of Thirty report, which Mr. Volcker spearheaded, proposed that 
MMMFs that wish to offer bank-like services, such as checking accounts and withdrawals at a 
stable NAV of $1 per share, should reorganize as “special-purpose banks” with appropriate 
governmental supervision and insurance.
202
  In contrast, MMMFs that do not wish to operate as 
banks should be required to base their redemption price on a floating NAV, so that investors are 
not misled into believing that they can always redeem their MMMFs shares at par.
203
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If Congress required nonbank MMMFs to base their redemption price on a floating NAV 
and also adopted my proposal for a two-tiered structure of bank regulation, many MMMFs 
would voluntarily reorganize as FDIC-insured narrow banks and would become subsidiaries of 
second-tier FHCs.
204
  As explained above, rules restricting the assets of narrow banks to 
commercial paper, government securities and other types of marketable, highly-liquid 
investments would protect the DIF from any significant loss if a narrow bank failed.  
ii. Four Additional Rules Would Prevent Narrow Banks from 
Transferring Safety Net Subsidies to Their Affiliates 
 
  Congress should adopt four supplemental rules to prevent second-tier holding companies 
from exploiting their narrow banks‟ safety net subsidies. First, narrow banks should be 
absolutely prohibited – without any possibility of a regulatory waiver – from making any 
extensions of credit or other transfers of funds to their affiliates, except for the payment of lawful 
dividends out of profits to their parent holding companies.
205
 Currently, transactions between 
FDIC-insured banks and their affiliates are restricted by §§ 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve 
Act.
206
  However, the FRB has repeatedly waived those restrictions during recent financial crises. 
The FRB‟s waivers have allowed bank subsidiaries of FHCs to provide extensive support to 
affiliated securities broker-dealers and MMMFs.  By granting those waivers, the FRB has 
enabled banks controlled by FHCs to transfer the safety net subsidy provided by low-cost, FDIC-
insured deposits to their nonbank affiliates.
207
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 Dodd-Frank limits the authority of the FRB to grant future waivers or exemptions under 
§§ 23A and 23B, because it requires the FRB to obtain the concurrence of either the OCC (with 
respect to waivers granted by orders for national banks) or the FDIC (with respect to waivers 
granted by orders for state banks or exemptions granted by rulemaking).
208
 Even so, it is unlikely 
that the OCC or the FDIC would refuse to concur with the FRB‟s proposal for a waiver under 
conditions of financial stress. Accordingly, Dodd-Frank does not ensure that the restrictions on 
affiliate transactions in §§ 23A and 23B will be adhered to in a crisis setting.   
 For example, the FRB recently permitted BofA to evade the restrictions of § 23A by 
transferring an undisclosed amount of derivatives contracts from its Merrill broker-dealer 
subsidiary to its subsidiary bank.  The transfer materially increased the potential risk to the DIF 
and taxpayers from any losses that BofA might incur on those derivatives.  However, the transfer 
reportedly enabled BofA – which has been struggling with a host of problems – to avoid a 
requirement to post $3.3 billion in additional collateral with counterparties, due to the fact that 
BofA‟s subsidiary bank enjoys a significantly higher credit rating than Merrill.209  One 
commentator noted that “the Fed‟s priorities seem to lie with protecting [BofA] from losses at 
Merrill, even if that means greater risks for the FDIC‟s insurance fund.”210  
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My proposal for second-tier narrow banks would replace §§ 23A and 23B with an 
absolute rule. That rule would completely prohibit any extensions of credit or other transfers of 
funds by second-tier banks to their nonbank affiliates (except for lawful dividends paid to parent 
holding companies). Under that rule, federal regulators would be barred from approving any 
transfers of safety net subsidies by narrow banks to their affiliates. An absolute bar on affiliate 
transactions is necessary to prevent FDIC-insured banks from being used as backdoor bailout 
devices for nonbank affiliates of LCFIs. 
Second, as discussed above, Congress should repeal the “systemic risk exception” 
(“SRE”) currently included in the FDI Act. By repealing the SRE, Congress would require the 
FDIC to follow the least costly resolution procedure for every failed bank, and the FDIC could 
no longer rely on the TBTF policy as a justification for protecting uninsured creditors of a failed 
bank or its nonbank affiliates.  Repealing the SRE would ensure that the DIF could not be used 
to support a bailout of uninsured creditors of a failed or failing SIFI. Removing the SRE from the 
FDIA would make clear to the financial markets that the DIF could only be used to protect 
depositors of failed banks. Uninsured creditors of SIFIs and their nonbank subsidiaries would 
therefore have stronger incentives to monitor the financial operations and condition of such 
entities.
211
  
 Additionally, a repeal of the SRE would mean that smaller banks would no longer bear 
any part of the cost of protecting uninsured creditors of TBTF banks.  Under current law, all 
FDIC-insured banks must pay a special assessment (allocated in proportion to their total assets) 
to reimburse the FDIC for the cost of protecting uninsured claimants of a TBTF bank under the 
SRE.
212
 A 2000 FDIC report noted the unfairness of expecting smaller banks to help pay for 
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“systemic risk” bailouts when “it is virtually inconceivable that they would receive similar 
treatment if distressed.”213  The FDIC report suggested that the way to correct this inequity is “to 
remove the [SRE],”214 as I have proposed here.   
 Third, second-tier narrow banks should be barred from purchasing derivatives except as 
end-users in transactions that qualify for hedging treatment under FAS 133.  Thus, my proposal 
would require all derivatives dealing and trading activities of second-tier banking organizations 
to be conducted through separate nonbank affiliates, in the same manner that GLBA currently 
requires all underwriting and dealing in bank-ineligible securities to be conducted through 
nonbank affiliates of FHCs.
215
 Prohibiting second-tier banks from dealing and trading in 
derivatives would accomplish an essential goal of the Volcker Rule and the Lincoln Amendment, 
because it would prevent FHCs from continuing to exploit federal safety net subsidies by 
conducting speculative trading activities within their FDIC-insured bank subsidiaries. 
BofA‟s recent transfer of derivatives from Merrill to its bank subsidiary demonstrates that 
bank dealers in OTC derivatives enjoy significant competitive advantages over nonbank dealers, 
due to the banks‟ explicit and implicit safety net subsidies.  Banks typically borrow funds at 
significantly lower interest rates than their holding company affiliates because (i) banks can 
obtain direct, low-cost funding through FDIC-insured deposits, and (ii) banks present lower risks 
to their creditors because of their direct access to other federal safety net resources, including (A) 
the FRB‟s discount window lending facility, (B) the FRB‟s guarantee of interbank payments 
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made on Fedwire, and (C) the greater potential availability of TBTF bailouts for uninsured 
creditors of banks (as compared to creditors of BHCs).
216
   
The OCC has confirmed that FHCs generate higher profits when they conduct derivatives 
activities directly within their banks, in part because the “favorable [funding] rate enjoyed by the 
banks” is lower than “the borrowing rate of their holding companies.”217 Such an outcome may 
be favorable to FHCs, but it is certainly not beneficial to the DIF and taxpayers. The DIF and 
taxpayers are exposed to a significantly higher risk of losses when derivatives dealing and 
trading activities are conducted directly within banks instead of within nonbank holding 
company affiliates.  Congress must terminate this artificial, federally-subsidized advantage for 
bank derivatives dealers.
218
  
 Fourth, Congress should prohibit all private equity investments by second-tier banks and 
their holding company affiliates. To accomplish this reform – which would be consistent with 
the Volcker Rule as originally proposed – Congress should repeal Sections 4(k)(4)(H) and (I) of 
the BHC Act,
219
 which allow FHCs to make merchant banking investments and insurance 
company portfolio investments.
220
  Private equity investments involve a high degree of risk and 
have inflicted significant losses on FHCs in the past.
221
  In addition, private equity investments 
threaten to “weaken the separation of banking and commerce” by allowing FHCs “to maintain 
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long-term control over entities that conduct commercial (i.e., nonfinancial) businesses.”222  Such 
affiliations between banks and commercial firms are undesirable because they are likely to create 
serious competitive and economic distortions, including the spread of federal safety net benefits 
to the commercial sector of our economy.
223
  
 In combination, the four supplemental rules described above would help to ensure that 
narrow banks cannot transfer their federal safety net subsidies to their nonbank affiliates. 
Restricting the scope of safety net subsidies is of utmost importance in order to restore a more 
level playing field between small and large banks, and between banking and nonbanking firms. 
Safety net subsidies have increasingly distorted our regulatory and economic policies over the 
past three decades. During that period, nonbanking firms have pursued every available avenue to 
acquire FDIC-insured depository institutions so that they can secure the funding advantages 
provided by low-cost, FDIC-insured deposits.  At the same time, nonbank affiliates of banks 
have made every effort to exploit the funding advantages and other safety net benefits conferred 
by their affiliation with FDIC-insured institutions.
224
   
 The most practicable way to prevent the spread of federal safety net subsidies – as well as 
their distorting effects on regulation and economic activity – is to establish strong barriers that 
prohibit narrow banks from transferring their subsidies to their nonbanking affiliates, including 
those engaged in speculative capital markets activities.  The narrow bank structure and the 
supplemental rules described above would force financial conglomerates to prove that they can 
produce superior risk-related returns to investors without relying on explicit and implicit 
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government subsidies. Economic studies have failed to confirm the existence of favorable 
economies of scale or scope in giant financial conglomerates, and those conglomerates have not 
been able to generate consistently positive returns, even under the current regulatory system that 
allows them to capture extensive federal subsidies.
225
  
In late 2009, a prominent bank analyst suggested that if Congress prevented nonbank 
subsidiaries of FHCs from relying on low-cost deposit funding provided by their affiliated banks, 
large FHCs would not be economically viable and would be forced to break up voluntarily.
226
 
Many of the largest commercial and industrial conglomerates in the U.S. and Europe have been 
broken up through hostile takeovers and voluntary divestitures during the past three decades 
because they proved to be “less efficient and less profitable than companies pursuing more 
focused business strategies.”227  It is long past time for financial conglomerates to be stripped of 
their safety net subsidies and their presumptive access to TBTF bailouts so that they will be 
subject to the same type of scrutiny and discipline that the capital markets have applied to 
commercial and industrial conglomerates during the past thirty years. The narrow bank concept 
provides a workable plan to impose such scrutiny and discipline on FHCs. 
c. Responses to Critiques of the Narrow Bank Proposal 
Critics have raised three major objections to the narrow bank concept. First, critics point 
out that the asset restrictions imposed on narrow banks would prevent them from acting as 
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intermediaries of funds between depositors and most borrowers. Many narrow bank proposals 
(including mine) would require narrow banks to invest their deposits in safe, highly marketable 
assets such as those permitted for MMMFs.  Narrow banks would therefore be largely or entirely 
barred from making commercial loans.  As a result, critics warn that a banking system composed 
exclusively of narrow banks could not provide credit to small and midsized business firms that 
lack access to the capital markets and depend on banks as their primary source of outside 
credit.
228
   
However, my two-tiered proposal would greatly reduce any disruption of the traditional 
role of banks in acting as intermediaries between depositors and bank-dependent firms, because 
my proposal would allow first-tier “traditional” banks (primarily community-oriented banks) to 
continue making commercial loans that are funded by deposits.  Community banks make most of 
their commercial loans in the form of longer-term “relationship” loans to SMEs.  Under my 
proposal, community banks could continue to carry on their deposit-taking and lending activities 
as first-tier banking organizations without any change from current law, and their primary 
commercial lending customers would continue to be smaller, bank-dependent firms.
229
  
 In contrast to community banks, big banks do not make a substantial amount of 
relationship loans to small firms.  Instead, big banks primarily make loans to large and well-
established firms, and they provide credit to small businesses mainly through highly automated 
programs that use impersonal credit scoring techniques.  Under my proposal, as indicated above, 
most large banks would operate as subsidiaries of second-tier “nontraditional” banking 
organizations.  Second-tier holding companies would conduct their business lending programs 
through nonbank finance subsidiaries that are funded by commercial paper and other debt 
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instruments sold to investors in the capital markets.  This operational structure should not create 
a substantial disincentive for the highly automated small business lending programs offered by 
big banks, because most loans produced by those programs (e.g., business credit card loans) can 
be financed by the capital markets through securitization.
230
  
Thus, my two-tier proposal should not cause a significant reduction in bank loans to 
bank-dependent firms, because big banks have already moved away from traditional 
relationship-based lending funded by deposits. If Congress wanted to give LCFIs a strong 
incentive to make relationship loans to small and midsized firms, Congress could authorize 
second-tier banks to devote a specified percentage (e.g., ten percent) of their assets to such loans, 
as long as the banks held the loans on their balance sheets and did not securitize them.  By 
authorizing such a limited “basket” of relationship loans, Congress could allow second-tier banks 
to use deposits to fund those loans without exposing the banks to a significant risk of failure, 
since the remainder of their assets would be highly liquid and marketable. 
 The second major criticism of the narrow bank proposal is that it would lack credibility 
because regulators would retain the inherent authority (whether explicit or implicit) to organize 
bailouts of major financial firms during periods of severe economic distress. Accordingly, some 
critics maintain that the narrow bank concept would simply shift the TBTF problem from insured 
banks to their nonbank affiliates.
231
  However, the force of this objection has been weakened by 
the systemic risk oversight and resolution regime established by Dodd-Frank. Under Dodd-
Frank, LCFIs that might have been considered for TBTF bailouts in the past will be designated 
and regulated as SIFIs and will also be subject to resolution under Dodd-Frank‟s OLA.  As 
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shown above, the potential for TBTF bailouts of SIFIs would be reduced further if (i) Congress 
required all SIFIs to pay risk-based premiums to pre-fund the OLF, so that the OLF would have 
the necessary resources to handle future resolutions of failed SIFIs, and (ii) Congress repealed 
the SRE so that the DIF would no longer be available as a potential bailout fund for TBTF 
institutions.   
Thus, if my proposed reforms were fully implemented, (i) the narrow bank structure 
would prevent SIFI-owned banks from transferring their safety net subsidies to their nonbank 
affiliates, and (ii) the systemic risk oversight and resolution regime would require SIFIs to 
internalize the potential risks that their operations present to financial and economic stability. In 
combination, both sets of regulatory reforms would greatly reduce the TBTF subsidies that might 
otherwise be available to large financial conglomerates. Moreover, the narrow bank structure 
would advance the purpose of “living wills” (resolution plans) by making it much easier for 
regulators to separate banks owned by failed SIFIs from their nonbank affiliates.  As discussed 
above, narrow banks would not be allowed to become entangled with their nonbank affiliates 
through extensions of credit and other transfers of funds.
232
 
The third principal objection to the narrow bank proposal is that it would place U.S. 
FHCs at a significant disadvantage in competing with foreign universal banks that are not 
required to comply with similar constraints.
233
 Again, there are persuasive rebuttals to this 
objection.  For example, the U.K. Independent Commission on Banking recently issued a report 
(the “Vickers Report”) that presents a reform program analogous to my proposal.  The Vickers 
Report has proposed a regime that would force large financial conglomerates to adopt a “ring-
fenced” structure that would separate their retail “utility” banking operations – including 
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financial services provided to consumers and SMEs – from their wholesale “casino” activities in 
the financial markets.
234
  U.K. analysts noted that the Vickers plan would require financial 
conglomerates to “build firewalls between their consumer units and investment banks” and likely 
cause “a jump in the cost of funding for their investment-banking divisions as the implicit [U.K.] 
government guarantee is removed.”235 The Cameron government has pledged to implement the 
recommendations of the Vickers Report by the end of the current Parliamentary session in 
2015.
236
  
If the U.S. and the U.K. both decide to implement a narrow banking structure 
(supplemented by strong systemic risk oversight and resolution regimes), their combined 
leadership in global financial markets would (i) eliminate claims by global SIFIs that they would 
face an unlevel playing field if they competing in both the New York and London financial 
markets, and (ii) place considerable pressure on other major global financial centers to adopt 
similar financial reforms.
237
  The financial sector accounts for a large share of the domestic 
economies of the U.S. and U.K. Both economies were severely damaged by two financial crises 
during the past decade (the dotcom-telecom bust and the subprime lending crisis).  Both crises 
were produced by the same set of LCFIs that continue to dominate the financial systems in both 
nations.  Accordingly, regardless of what other nations may do, the U.S. and the U.K. have 
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compelling national reasons to make sweeping changes to their financial systems in order to 
protect their domestic economies from the threat of a similar crisis in the future.
238
  
The view that the U.S. and the U.K. must refrain from implementing fundamental 
financial reforms until all other major developed nations have agreed to do so rests upon two 
deeply flawed assumptions: (i) the U.S. and the U.K. should allow foreign nations with the 
weakest systems of financial regulation to dictate the level of supervisory constraints on LCFIs, 
and (ii) until a comprehensive international agreement on reform is achieved, the U.S. and the 
U.K. should continue to provide TBTF bailouts and other safety net subsidies that impose huge 
costs, create moral hazard and distort economic incentives simply because other nations provide 
similar benefits to their LCFIs.
239
  Both assumptions are unacceptable and must be rejected.  
d. The Relevance of the Schumer “Core Banking” Proposal of 1991 
In 1991, Congress considered, but did not pass, legislation proposed by the Treasury 
Department to allow banks to affiliate with securities firms and insurance companies by 
organizing financial holding companies.  During the House debates on the 1991 legislation, 
which was essentially a forerunner of GLBA,
240
 then-Representative Charles Schumer offered an 
amendment that incorporated a narrow banking proposal similar to the one I have presented in 
this testimony.
241
  Representative Schumer argued that Congress should not authorize financial 
holding companies unless it adopted his amendment, which he described as a “core bank 
proposal.”242  His proposal sought to guarantee that “insured deposits [are] used for low-risk, 
traditional banking activities, and then if our large financial institutions wish to invest in high-
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risk activities, they do not use the depositors‟ money, they do not use insured dollars, but they go 
to the markets for money.”243 
Representative Schumer maintained that the FDIC and taxpayers should not be insuring 
such risky activities as “huge bridge loans to LBO‟s, . . . equity investments in real estate[,] . . . 
foreign currency trading and trading in . . . , derivatives, which is betting on futures.”244  He 
noted that “[m]ost of the large banks are opposed because they do not want to take the necessary 
medicine to make them better,” but he argued that “[t]hey need strong medicine, and only core 
banking provides it.”245  Representative Marge Roukema supported the proposal because “the 
core bank concept is the only proposal before us to insulate the deposit insurance fund and 
protect the taxpayer from future bailouts.”246  She agreed that “insured deposits should only be 
used to finance [the] traditional business of banking” and should not be used to “finance highly 
speculative lending, equity investments or other activities which should be done outside the 
Federal safety net.”247 
Representative Schumer‟s core banking proposal was defeated.248 However, he was 
undoubtedly correct in saying that his proposal was the “only amendment on the floor today that 
says we will not do what we did during the S&L crisis, and that is [to] use insured dollars for 
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risky activities.”249  He argued that Congress had grievously erred in 1982, when it allowed 
federal thrifts to “expand into new businesses with the taxpayers‟ dollars.”250  He further warned 
that Congress would be confronted with a future bailout of the banking system that could cost 
“$300 billion”  
unless we reform the system today.  Do not put it off.  Do not delay.  The 
taxpayers cannot afford it.  Only [the] core bank [proposal] will protect the 
insured deposit system once and for all.
251
 
 
Unfortunately, Representative Schumer‟s warning not only proved to be prescient but 
also underestimated the potential cost of allowing banks to expand into capital markets activities 
while relying on federal safety net subsidies.  As the current financial crisis has made clear, 
Congress must mandate narrow banking in order to prevent FDIC-insured banks from being used 
to subsidize similar high-risk underwriting, trading and investment activities in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
Dodd-Frank makes meaningful improvements in the regulation of large financial 
conglomerates.  Dodd-Frank establishes a new umbrella oversight body – the FSOC – that will 
designate nonbank SIFIs and make recommendations for the supervision of those institutions and 
large BHCs.  Dodd-Frank also empowers the FRB to adopt stronger capital requirements and 
other enhanced prudential standards for both types of SIFIs.  Most importantly, Dodd-Frank 
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establishes a new systemic resolution regime – the OLA – that should provide a superior 
alternative to the “bailout or bankruptcy” choice that federal regulators confronted when they 
dealt with failing SIFIs during the financial crisis.  However, the OLA‟s feasibility remains 
unproven with regard to global SIFIs that operate across multiple national borders, since most 
foreign countries do not have resolution procedures that are congruent with the OLA.
252
  
In addition, as explained above, the OLA does not completely shut the door to future 
government rescues for creditors of SIFIs.  The FRB can still provide emergency liquidity 
assistance to troubled LCFIs through the discount window and (perhaps) through “broad-based” 
liquidity facilities like the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, which are designed to help targeted 
groups of the largest financial institutions.  FHLBs can still make advances to LCFIs.  The FDIC 
can potentially use its Treasury borrowing authority and the SRE to protect uninsured creditors 
of failed SIFIs and their subsidiary banks.  While Dodd-Frank has undoubtedly made TBTF 
bailouts more difficult, the continued existence of these avenues for financial assistance indicates 
that Dodd-Frank is not likely to prevent future TBTF rescues during future episodes of systemic 
financial distress.  A recent report by Standard & Poor‟s (“S&P”) concluded that Dodd-Frank 
does not eliminate the TBTF problem.  S&P determined that “under certain circumstances and 
with selected systemically important financial institutions, future extraordinary government 
support is still possible.”253  
Dodd-Frank also relies heavily on the same supervisory tools – capital-based regulation 
and prudential supervision – that failed to prevent the banking and thrift crises of the 1980s as 
well as the current financial crisis.  The reforms contained in Dodd-Frank depend for their 
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effectiveness on many of the same federal regulatory agencies that failed to stop excessive risk-
taking by financial institutions during the credit booms that preceded both crises.  As Simon 
Johnson and James Kwak observe: 
[S]olutions that depend on smarter, better regulatory supervision and corrective action 
ignore the political constraints on regulation and the political power of the large banks. 
The idea that we can simply regulate large banks more effectively assumes that regulators 
will have the incentive to do so, despite everything we know about regulatory capture and 
political constraints on regulation.
254
  
 
The future effectiveness of the FSOC is also open to serious question in light of the agency turf 
battles and other bureaucratic failings that have plagued similar multi-agency oversight bodies in 
other fields of regulation (e.g., the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence).
255
   
 As an alternative to Dodd-Frank‟s regulatory reforms, Congress could have addressed the 
TBTF problem directly by mandating a breakup of large financial conglomerates. That is the 
approach advocated by Johnson and Kwak, who have proposed maximum size limits of four 
percent of GDP (about $570 billion in assets) for commercial banks and two percent of GDP 
(about $285 billion of assets) for securities firms. Those size caps would require a significant 
reduction in size for the six largest U.S. banking organizations (BofA, Chase, Citigroup, Wells 
Fargo, Goldman and Morgan Stanley).
256
  Like Joseph Stiglitz, Johnson and Kwak maintain that 
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“[t]he best defense against a massive financial crisis is a popular consensus that too big to fail is 
too big to exist.”257 
 Congress did not follow the approach recommended by Johnson, Kwak and Stiglitz. In 
fact, the Senate rejected a similar proposal for maximum size limits by almost a two-to-one 
vote.
258
  As noted above, Congress modestly strengthened Riegle-Neal‟s 10% nationwide deposit 
cap.  However, that provision does not restrict “failing bank” mergers, intrastate mergers or 
acquisitions, or organic (internal) growth by LCFIs.  In addition, Congress gave FSOC and the 
FRB broad discretion to decide whether to impose a 10% nationwide liabilities cap on mergers 
and acquisitions involving financial companies.  LCFIs will undoubtedly seek to block the 
adoption of any such liabilities cap. 
I am sympathetic to the maximum size limits proposed by Johnson and Kwak.  However, 
it seems highly unlikely – especially in light of megabanks‟ enormous political clout – that 
Congress could be persuaded to adopt such draconian limits, absent a future disaster comparable 
to the present financial crisis.
259
  
 A third possible approach – and the one I advocate – would be to impose structural 
requirements and activity limitations that would (i) prevent LCFIs from using the federal safety 
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net protections for their subsidiary banks to subsidize their speculative activities in the capital 
markets, and (ii) make it easier for regulators to separate banks from their nonbank affiliates if 
FHCs or their subsidiary banks fail.  As originally proposed, the Volcker Rule and the Lincoln 
Amendment would have barred proprietary trading and private equity investments by banking 
organizations and would have forced banks to spin off their derivatives trading and dealing 
activities into nonbank affiliates.  However, the House-Senate conferees on Dodd-Frank greatly 
weakened both provisions and postponed their effective dates.  In addition, both provisions as 
enacted contain potential loopholes that will allow LCFIs to lobby regulators for further 
concessions.  Consequently, neither provision is likely to be highly effective in restraining risk-
taking or the spread of safety net subsidies by LCFIs. 
 My proposals for a pre-funded OLF, a repeal of the SRE, and a two-tiered system of bank 
regulation would provide a simple, straightforward strategy for accomplishing the goals of 
shrinking safety net subsidies and minimizing the need for taxpayer-financed bailouts of SIFIs.  
A pre-funded OLF would require all SIFIs to pay risk-based assessments to finance the future 
costs of resolving failed SIFIs.  A repeal of the SRE would prevent the DIF from being used as a 
backdoor mechanism to protect uninsured creditors of megabanks.  A two-tiered system of bank 
regulation would (i) restrict traditional banking organizations to deposit-taking, lending, 
fiduciary services and other activities that are “closely related” to banking, and (ii) mandate a 
“narrow bank” structure for banks owned by financial conglomerates.  In turn, the narrow bank 
structure would (A) insulate narrow banks and the DIF from the risks of capital markets 
activities conducted by nonbank affiliates, and (B) prevent narrow banks from transferring their 
low-cost funding and other safety net subsidies to nonbank affiliates.   
 74 
 In combination, my proposed reforms would strip away many of the safety net subsidies 
that are currently exploited by LCFIs and would subject them to the same type of market 
discipline that investors have applied to commercial and industrial conglomerates over the past 
thirty years.  Financial conglomerates have never demonstrated that they can provide beneficial 
services to their customers and attractive returns to their investors without relying on safety net 
subsidies during good times and massive taxpayer-funded bailouts during crises.  It is long past 
time for LCFIs to prove – based on a true market test – that their claimed synergies and their 
supposedly superior business model are real and not mythical.
260
  If, as I suspect, LCFIs cannot 
produce favorable returns when they are deprived of their current subsidies and TBTF status, 
market forces should compel them to break up voluntarily. 
 Thank you again for the opportunity to present this testimony.              
       Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.  (12/5/11) 
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